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DOUBLE HELIX, DOUBLE BIND: FACTUAL INNOCENCE AND 
POSTCONVICI'ION DNA TESTING 
SETH F. KREIMERt & DAVID RUDOVSKYtt 
INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TwO CONVICTIONS 
A. The Bruce Godscha/A Stury 
In the summer of 1986, less than two months apart, two women 
who lived in the same housing complex in Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania, were raped by an assailant who .entered their apart-
ments at night. Based on the descriptions provided by the victims, 
and the similar means of entry into the residences and other actions 
of the assailant, it appeared highly probable that a single person was 
responsible for both attacks. The police prepared a composite sketch 
of the suspect. Several months later, based on a call from Bruce God-
schalk's sister informing authorities that her brother looked like the 
person in the sketch, the police showed a photo spread to the victims, 
one of whom identified Godschalk. Soon thereafter, the police 
brought Godschalk into the police district and interrogated him about 
the incidents. According to the police, in noncustodial questioning, 
and with no pressure or coercion, Godschalk readily admitted to the 
crimes in a taped interview.2 Indeed, the police claimed that he pro-
t Professor of Law, University or Pennsylvania Law SchooL 
t1 Senior Fellow, University of Pennsyh·,mia Law Sch()Qt. 
We gratefully acknowledge the illuminating comments of our colleagues AI Al-
schuler, Susan Herman, Leo Katz, Stephen Morse, and Leonard Sosnov; the very help-
ful research assistance of Leonardo Cuello and Vanessa Richards; and the pathbreak· 
ing work in DNA exoneration of the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law. Aid from these sources in the development of this Article in no way 
makes them responsible for any errors of fact or law, which remain the responsibility of 
the authors alone. 
1 
In the intere:'lt of full disclosure, it should be noted that the authors are part of 
the team of counsel that represented Bruce Godschalk in this case and that currently 
seeks to obtain damages for his wrongful incarceration. This team also includes Peter 
Neufeld and Barry Scheck from the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School. 
1 
Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 
368-69 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The police questioned Godschalk for approximately two hours 
before he gave a statement; only the formal "confession" was taped. !d. at 368. 
(547) 
548 UNTVERSn'Y OF PENNSYLVANIA I.A W REVIEW [Vol. 151: 547 
vided details of the assaults that only the victims, the police, and the 
rapist knew, as the police had not disseminated this information to 
the public.~ · 
At trial, the prosecution presented the eyewitness testimony (a 
complainant testified that she studied and compared the photographs 
presented to her by the detective)/ the confession, evidence of the 
similar modus operandi of the rapist, and a jailhouse informant who 
testified that Godschalk admitted the crimes to him while in jail await-
ing trial.5 
In addition, the prosecutor otfered scientific evidence: the semen 
recovered from the first rape was from a man with type B blood, and 
Godschalk had type B blood. Godschalk, who had recanted his "con-
fession" pretrial, testified that the detectives tricked him into admit-
ting the crimes and asserted that they provided him with the private 
details of the assaults. Not surprisingly, with a full confession, modus 
operandi evidence, eyewitness identification, and blood-type match-
~ ld. 
4 
In recent studies, the dangers of witnesses making false identifications as a result 
ofphotospreads shown in groups have been well documented. Witnesses in such situa-
tions may select the person who most closely resembles the assailant, even if they can· 
not independently identify that person. Furthermore, unless they are informed that 
the investigation will continue even if they do not make an identification, many will 
believe that the matter will be dropped if they do not identify a suspect. See NAT'L. 
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 19 (1999) (outlining basic procedures to obtain the most reliable and 
accurate information from eyewitnesses), available m http:/ /www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ 
nij/178240.pdf; Gary L. Wells et al., J:.)ewitness ldmtification Procedures: Recommnui.ations 
for l..i.neups and Photospreads. 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 629 (1998) (detailing instruc· 
tions that should be given to eyewitnesses when viewing lineups or photospreads). See 
gmerally ELI:i'..ABETH F. LOFfUS & jAMES M. D0\'1.£, EYEWlTNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 4 (3d ed. 1997) (identifYing wa}'J to prevent. mist.1ken identification). 
Some observers recommend that witnesses be informed that the investigation will con· 
tinue regardless of their ability to identify, that the detective showing the photographs 
not know the "prime suspect," and that the photographs be shown sequentially to 
avoid the comparison process. Wells et al., supra, at 627. 
~ The unreliability of jailhouse infonnants' testimony has been well documented. 
~. e.g., REPORT OF THE H .. LINOJS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
(Apr. 15, 2002) (containing recommendations for specific improvements to the capital 
punishment system in Illinois), av.aiklble at http;/ /www.idoc,state.il.u8/ccp/ccp/ 
reports/commission_report/complete_report.pdf. Police use of jailhouse informants 
is subject to some constitutional limitations, but informants' testimony is generally ad-
missible and issues of credibility are left to the jury. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
436, 455 (1986) (holding that a prisoner who made statements to a jailhouse infor-
mant was not entitled to relief because there was overwhelming evidence of the pris-
oner's guilt and his constitutional claim did not "itself raise any question as to his guilt 
or innocence"). But see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (holding that 
a prisoner's statements to an informant should not have been admitted at trial). 
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ings, the jury convicted Godschalk of both crimes. In 1987, he was 
sentenced to a term often to twenty years' imprisonment. 
In 1995, based on Pennsylvania cases establishing a qualified right 
to postconviction access to previously untested DNA evidence,ti God-
schalk filed a petition seeking access to the DNA evidence from both 
incidents still held by the Disuict Attomey.7 The Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania denied access on the grounds that the prosecution's case 
was overwhelming and that it rested on more than contested eyewit-
ness identification.8 
Godschalk then filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for access to the DNA evidence, claiming a constitutional right to ac-
cess and testing as a matter of due process of law. The District Attor-
ney opposed this action, arguing that it was procedurally barred by the 
Rookn:-Feldman doctrine9 and that there was no constitutional right to 
access to potentially exculpatory evidence postconviction. In support 
of the defense to the civil litigation, the disuict attorney stressed the 
strength of the State's case at u;al and, in particular, Godschalk's con-
fession with its numerous details of facts known only to the complain-
ants, police, and rapist. The disuict court ruled that the Rooker-
'
1 
See Commonwealth v. Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (affirming 
grant of prisoner's request for postconviction relief and DNA testing, and granting n 
new trial on the basis of test results); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425 (Pa. 
Super. C:t. 1992) ("[P]rinciples of justice require us to \"dCate appellant's conviction 
and remand to the trial court for the performance nf DNA analysis on the samples 
taken from the victim.~). · 
7 
In the firy;t rape, the police had seized semen samples from the carpet, and the 
prosecutors used the evidence at trial to prove the blood type of the perpetrator. The 
police also had semen samples from a rape kit for the victim, including a vaginal swab. 
In the second rape, the police had semen evidence from the victim (vaginal swab) and 
her clothing. 
8 Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295, 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). As the 
court stated: "Appellant's conviction rests largely on his own confession which con· 
tains details of the rapes which were not available to the public." ld. at 1297. 
u The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal court from adjudicating a claim 
previously decided in the state courts, but only when the identical claim had been ad· 
judkated in the state courts or when the "'federal claim is inextricably intertwined with 
the state-courtjudgment [so that] the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that 
the state court wrongly decidi!d the issues before it.'" Centifanti v. Nix. 865 F.2d 1422, 
1430 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. I, 25 (1987) (Mar· 
shall,]., concurring)); see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,473 (1983) 
(holding that federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from state court decisions); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 
(1923) ("[l]t was the province and duty of the state courts to decide [the constitutional 
questions] .... Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other 
than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for 
errors of that character."). 
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Feldman doctrine was inapplicable and that the Brady v. Maryland' 0 due 
process duty of disclosure of exculpatory evidence extended to post-
conviction DNA evidence, regardless of the evidence that supported 
the conviction.'' 
The parties then agreed to a protocol under which the DNA evi-
dence was divided for testing by their respective laboratories. Testing 
at each laboratory confirmed that a single rapist had committed both 
assaults but that Bruce Godschalk was absolutely excluded as being 
that assailant. 12 In February 2002, on a petition for postconviction re-
lief, Godschalk was freed and the criminal charges against him were 
10 
373 u.s. 83 {1963). 
11 
Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. A•.torney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 
370 (E. D. Pa. 2001 ). Although the district attorney initially appealed the trial court's 
rulinf• he ultimately withdrew the appeal. 
1 
The labOI'atory reports are on file with the authors. The extraordinary scientific 
advances in forensic DNA technology and research have provided genetic «fingerprint· 
ing" techniques that can detinitively differentiate one person from another. The two 
most commonly u~ed tests (Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism rRFLP") test-
ing and Polymes-ase Chain Reaction ("PCR") testing) can make distinctions even be-
tween people who are related. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
HANDLING RI~QUESl'S 26-28 (1999), (11J(Iilab!P. at Imp:/ /www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/ 
177626.pdf. Moreover, very few cells are needed to conduct the testing, and Short 
Tandem Repeat ("STR") testing can produce reliable results even with degraded sam-
ples. ltL at 23. In Harvey v. Horan, judge Luttig explained the power of cusTent DNA 
testing technology: 
The current ~tandard STR test examim::s 13 independent regions of DNA 
("loci"), set: [NAT'L INST.J FORjUS1"1CE, IMPROVED ANAL\'SIS OF DNA SHORT 
TANDE..I\f REI'EA'T'S 2 (2001), although testing at just 8-10 loci usually is suffi· 
cient to distinguish between any two persons who arc nru identical ~ins. Sn 
[B.J Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA ringrnprinting: A Critique of the 
NRC's &port. 259 [SCi.] 748 (1993j. In fact, researchel'll have found that the 
probability that any two unrelated individuals match at 9 specific loci (the 
"matching probability") is approximately 1 in 740 billion. St:e Lucia Sacchetti 
et al., Efficiency of Two Different Nine-Loti Slwrt Tandem &peat Systems fur DNA 
Tyt1i11g Purposes, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 178, 182 (1999). Because the stan-
dard test probes l3loci (not 8 or 9), it should be correspondingly more pow-
erful. Even the mou eon5erv<~tive estimates h;lve placed tl1is matching prob-
ability as high as I in 100 billion, St!8 [NAT't.INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra. at 15). It 
is also worth noting that some current generatkm STR systems have matching 
probabilities on the order of 1 in l quadrillion. See Mark Benecke, DNA Ty~ 
ing in Forensic Medicint: and i11 Criminal fnve.stigations: A Cu·rrent Suroey, 84 
NATURWISSENSC~IAITEN 181, .183 (1997). For purposes of understanding the 
magnitude of these figures of probability, it is estimated that there are only 6 
billion persons on the planet. See [http;/ /www.un.org/esa/population/ 
publications/wpp2000 /highlights. pdf]. 
Harvey v. Hor.m, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.l (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig. J., concurring) (dta· 
tion omitted). 
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dismissed.1' Bruce Godschalk had served fifteen years of his ten-to-
twenty-year sentence. Although he was eligible for parole at his 
minimum of ten years, in all likelihood he would have served his en-
tire sentence of twenty years. In Pennsylvania, parole in sexual assault 
cases is largely dependent on the defendant's admission of guilt and 
participation in sex offender programs, neither of which the innocent 
Godschalk would accept. Bruce Godschalk thus became one of more 
than 100 persons exonerated of serious criminal convictions by post-
conviction DNA testing.14 
B. The Prank Lee Smith Stury 
In early 2000, Florida death row inmate Frank Lee Smith died of 
cancer. On his deathbed Smith had reasserted his long-held claim to 
innocence and continued to demand that the State agree to test DNA 
evidence from the crime scene. Smith had been convicted of the 1985 
rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl, based largely on a single 
eyewitness identification (with no physical evidence of his involve-
ment). In 1989, this sole eyewitness recanted her testimony, alleging 
that the police had pressured her and had repeatedly told her that 
"Smith was dangerous."15 Indeed, at the time of the recantation, the 
witness named another person, Eddie Lee Mosely, as the killer. De-
fense lawyers were able to point to other evidence that strongly con-
nected the crime to Mosely, then a prime suspect in a number of sex-
ual assaults and murders.16 
For years, prosecutors had refused defense requests to test existing 
DNA evidence. As Smith lay dying in pain and delirium in a prison 
hospital, the slow wheels of justice finally ground to a point where test-
ing was authorized. Ten months after his death in prison, in Decem-
her of 2000, the test result~ cleared Smith of any involvement in the 
crime." Prosecutors had claimed that state law did not permit a post-
u The district attorney initially refused to agree to release or dismiss the charges, 
stating that he believed that the tests were ~flawed." However, he could provide no ba-
sis for this claim other than the assertion that he believed in his detective and had a 
full confession. Sara Rimer, Convict's DNA Sways Labs, Not a Determined Prosecutor, N.Y. 
TIMFS, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al 4. 
B See Innocence Project, at http:/ /www.innocenceproject.org (reporting that, as 
of November 26, 2002, 116 persons were exonerated). 
~~ 
Sydney Freedberg, DNA Clears Inmate Too Lflte, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. ] 5, 
2000, at JA. 
)6 /d. 
!7 /d. 
552 UNIVERSITY OF Pl!.NNSYL VANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 547 
convtcuon challenge based on the outstanding DNA evidence and 
had accused the defense lawyers of "playing games" to delay Smith's 
execution. 18 Upon receiving the test results, the prosecutor stated that 
she would move to vacate Smith's conviction.19 He spent fourteen 
years on death row and died with his request for DNA testing still in 
limbo. 
C. The Problem 
Godschalk and Smith are representative cases in a growing pool of 
DNA exonerations.w They are also representative of the legal strug-
gles over claims to access to DNA for postconviction testing.~1 Com-
18 
/d.· Under Florida law, there was no right to postconviction access to DNA evi-
dence, even when the evidence could exonerate by proving complete innocence. The 
legislature had refused to reform the law prior to Smith's exoneration, and even after 
this event Florida's DNA testing statute retains substantial limitations on the circum-
stances under which prisoners may be entitled to test potentially exculpatory DNA evi· 
dence. See Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA 
Testing), 807 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam) (discussing new state rules gov-
erning DNA testing in criminal cases); id. ~t 636 (Anstead,J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in pan) (criticizing DNA testing rules for excluding those convicted 
through plea barg-.aining because Mplea bargaining often results in many cases of pleas 
of convenience or best interests where ... the uncertain risk of trial on ... more seri· 
ous charges t:ompels him to accept conviction ... even while maintaining innocence"). 
19 Freedberg, supra note 15. 
2fl &e JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 
(2000) (discuuing the most common factors that led to sixty-two wrongful convic-
tions); Sharon Cohen & Deborah Hastings, Stnlim. Uves in Prisrm: DNA Evidence Is Set-
ting Joree tlut Wrongfully Convicted. But ltWlat Happens to Them Thtn r, CONN. L. TRIB., June 
24, 2002, at 1 (detailing an Associated Press study of 110 inmate.~ exonerated by post-
conviction DNA testing). :fhe Innocence Prqject keeps a current count of the number 
of exonerations nationwide on its website. Innocence Pr(!ject, at 
hup://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2002). 
~ 1 .')ee, e.g., Bradley\'. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-92 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (holding that 
plisoner's § 1983 claim seeking DNA evidence was not procedurally barred); Boyle v. 
Mayer, No. 02-3124, 2002 U.S. App. LEXfS 19654, at *24 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2002) 
(denying postconviction effort to obtain DNA on procedural grounds); Kutzner v. 
Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (denying post-
conviction effort to obtain DNA samples on procedural grounds); Harvey v. Horan, 
278 F.3d 370,380 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying postconviction request for access to DNA), 
reh'g denied, 285 F.3c1 298 (4th Cir. 2002); Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. At-
torney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366,370 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("[Prisoner) has a due proc-
ess right of access to the genetic material for the limited purpose of DNA testing."); 
Lee v. Clark County Dist. Attorney's Office, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187-88 (D. Nev. 
2001) (dismis.~ing postconviction effort to obtain DNA samples as unripe, in light of 
available state court procedure); State v. EJ-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 746 (Neb. 2000) 
(holding r.hat defendant could not bring request under postconviction statute for DNA 
testing that would allegedly show actual innocence, in absence of a showing of consti· 
tutional violation); cf Clason v. McKenzie, No. 8:02CV206, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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paring the ultimate outcomes in the two cases, one might expect 
moral consensus that Smith is to be avoided and that Godschalk is to be 
preferred.22 Few courts or prosecutors directly advance the proposi-
tion that the judicial system should permit the incarceration of mani-
festly innocent individuals.23 In a system where as a matter of constitu-
tional law "[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not 
be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether 
innocent men are being condemned,"24 this preference has a strong 
claim to constitutional stature. 
In the criminal justice system today, however, the status of post-
conviction DNA testing is a matter of some contest. It is to that con-
test that this Article is addressed. In Part I, we will survey the current 
practices and policies of prosecutors in responding to requests for 
postconviction DNA testing. As that review reveals, the hurdles faced 
by Bruce Godschalk and Frank Lee Smith are not inevitable, for many 
prosecutors view the importance of DNA testing's potential to exon-
erate the innocent as equal to its role in convicting the guilty. But 
neither are the dilemmas faced by Godschalk and Smith isolated or 
13044, at *10 (D. Neb. July 12, 2002) (granting access to DNA samples to test origin of 
inculpatory urine in parole revocation proceeding). For a fuller account, see infra 
note 133. 
2'l Preferred, of course, only with respect to the order for disclosure bt-fore God-
schalk completed his sentence. . 
2~ There are, however, a complex set of procedural barriers to access to the courts 
to prove innocence. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (hold· 
ing that federal habeas courts may not review a state court's denial of a state prisoner's 
federal constitutional claim if the state court decision rested on a state procedural de· 
fault); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,503 (1991) (finding prisoner's failure to raise 
his Massiab. claim in his first federal habeas petition constituted abuse of the writ). The 
1996 amendments to the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241·2255 (2000), 'in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.), severely restricted access to 
habeas corpus. Ste JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS, 
PRACfiCE Ao'lD PROCEDURE 83 (4th ed. 2001) (giving an overview of the federal habeas 
corpus process under AEDPA). Indeed, it is not entirely dear that a claim of "factual 
innocence" is cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Set Herrera v. Collins, 506 U$. 390, 
417 (1993) (finding that, even if there were an actUal innocence federal habeas claim, 
the threshold would he ue)l:traordinarily" high and that the prisoner's case fell "far 
short of any such threshold"); Burton v, Dorm ire, 295 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that a state prisoner was not entitled to federal habeas relief based on his 
claims offactual innocence); see also infra Part Ill (discussing the status of claims of fac-
tual innocence). 
24 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); ste id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concuning) 
(invoking the "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free~); see also infra Part III (dis· 
cussing the importance of protecting the innocent in our criminal justice system). 
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unique, for hostility to postconviction access typifies an important sec-
tor of the prosecutorial community. The Article will then address the 
principal doctrinal bases for a constitutional right to postconviction 
disclosure: prisoners' rights of meaningful access to the courts (Part 
II) and the due process obligations of the state to disclose exculpatory 
evidence and to avoid arbitrary deprivations of liberty (Part III). In 
Part IV, we consider the arguments that have been mounted, both 
substantive and procedural, as balancing factors against the constitu-
tional claims, and conclude that in the cases where DNA is potentially 
determinatively exculpatory, those factors are unpersuasive. 
I. PROSECUTION PRACTICES 
Before trial, by rules of criminal procedure and federal constitu~ 
tional mandate, defendants are entitled access to physical evidence for 
forensic testing.w; After trial, however, in the states that have not 
adopted statutes giving convicted defendants the right to seek DNA 
testing,2f• the disposition of physical evidence rests largely in the dis-
cretion of prosecutors, police officers in evidence rooms, and court 
clerks. 
~' See, e.g .• FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(C)-(D) (requiring the state to provide docu-
ment~. tangible evidence, and scientific reports to defendant1 in criminal cases); PA. R. 
CRJM. P. 573(8)( 1) (requiring the state to provide the defendant with tangible evi-
dence, among other things); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 
("[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accu.~ed upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment."); 
see alfo infm Part Ill (describing the state's obligation to provide exculpatory evidence). 
:til q: freeing Off,.rukrs wit/' Scittnt:t, CJ LETTER: NEWS ON CRJM. JUST. ISSUES (Nat' I 
Conference of State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2001, at 1-2 (detailing legis-
lation in twenty-five states providing for postconviction DNA testing in some circum-
stances), http:/ /www.ncsl.org/progr.lms/cj/cjl31101.htm; Innocence Project, Legisla-
tion, at http:/ /www.innocenceproject.org/legislation/display_legislation.php (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2002) (listing twenty-nine state statutes and six pending state statutes 
providing for postconviction DNA testing in some circumstances). Even where statutes 
provide some access to postconviction DNA testing, the access may be constrained by 
short time limits, the exclusion of guilty pie~. or procedural bars. 
For reviews of state statutes regulating access to evidence for rorensic testing, see 
Rochelle L Haller, The lnfiiXma Prot«twn Act: Why Ftdcral MtaSUres /Uquiring Post-
Conviction DNA Tesling and Preservation of tvideme Are Nudtd in Order to &dw:e the Risk of 
Wrongf"l.Execution, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 101, 122-31 (2001) (reviewing New 
York, Virginia, California, Illinois, and Texas legislation); Jerilyn Stanley, DNA: Law 
Enfrm:r.ment :v Miracle of Twmolog;y: 1'/u Missing Link to Tmth and Justice, 32 MCGEORGE 
L. REv. 601, 603-09 (2001) (reviewing California legislation); Karen Christian, Note, 
"And the DNA Shall &t You Pree»: ls.nu-.s Surroun&ng Postconviclion DNA Evidencr (tnd tht. 
Pursuit of lmux:!J11Cr, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 1195, 1202-08 (200.1) (reviewing New York and 
Illinois legislation). 
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For many prosecutors, the possibility of freeing wrongly convicted 
prisoners is as important an element of the emerging DNA technolo-
gies as the possibility of finding and convicting the guilty. Indeed, 
when an innocent defendant is incarcerated the wrongdoer remains 
unpunished. In 1996, in response to a National Institute of Justice 
(Nij) report,27 Attorney General Janet Reno appointed a National 
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, composed of represen-
tatives of law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, to rec-
ommend standards for postconviction DNA testing. The Commission 
developed five categories of cases: 
Category l. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected 
and still exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting, 
exclusionary results will exonerate the petitioner. 
Example (]: Petitioner was convicted of the rape of a sexually inac-
tive child. Vaginal swabs were taken and preserved. DNA evidence 
that excludes the petitioner as the source of the sperm will be dis-
positive of innocence. Note that in a case such as this, the victim's 
DNA-also obtainable from the vaginal swab-operates as a control 
that confirms that the correct sample is being tested. In addition, 
the victim's age and sexual status guarantee that the swab contains 
only biological material related to the crime. 
Category 2. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected 
and still exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting, 
exclusionary results would support the petitioner's claim of innocence, 
but reasonable persons might disagree as to whether the results rule out 
the possibility of guilt or raise a reasonable doubt about guilt. 
Example []: Petitioner was convicted of a homicide. The prosecu-
tion argued in closing that blood on a shirt found at petitioner's 
home came from the victim. Standard blood typing had shown a 
match between the sample and u'ie victim's blood. DNA testing ~hal 
excludes the victim as a source of the bloodstains might be helpful 
to petitioner's claims but does not prove that he was not guilty. 
Category 3. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected 
and still exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting, 
the results will not be relevant to a guilt or innocence determination. 
27 
EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICfED BY jURIES, EXONERATED BY SciENCE: CAsE 
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO EsrABUSH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (Nat'l 
Inst. ofjustice, Series No. 161258, 1996), http:/ /www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/dnaevid.txt. 
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Example []: Petitioner is presendy incarcerated for a gang rape. 
The victim testified that seven persons were involved but that she is 
not sure that all actually engaged in sexual intercourse. If the vagi-
nal sWabs that were preseived are 'tested and petitioner's DNA pro-
tile is not found, the significance of the results will be minimal. It 
should be noted, however, that if other participants in the rape can 
be identified through DNA testing and petitioner can show the un-
likelihood that he ever had any contact with the other participants, 
this case may fall into category 1 or 2. 
Category 4. These are cases in which biological evidence was never col-
lected, or cannot be found despite all efforts, or was destroyed, or was 
preserved in such a way that it cannot be tested. In such a case, postcon-
viction relief on the ?asis of DNA testing is not possible. 
Category 5. These'are cases in which a request for DNA testing is frivo-
lous. 
Example []: The trial transcript discloses the existence of other 
evidence that makes petitioner's claim meaningless, as in a burglary 
conviction where petitioner was apprehended at the scene of the 
• 211 
crt me. 
The Commission recommended full access to DNA evidence without 
resort to the courts in Category 1 cases, court resolution of any dis-
putes over access in Category 2 cases, and no access in Categories 3, 4, 
and 5.:!!1 
We do no~ necessarily agree with this entire formulation as a mat-
ter of policy. For example, in Category 2, while th~ DNA evidence 
might not be determi.native of guilt or innocence, where the prosecu-
tor relied at trial' on a theory inconsistent with this evidence it may 
well be extremely strong proof that the wrong result was reached. In 
Category 5, if the burglar had cut herself and left blood at the scene, 
DNA testing might be fully exonerating, ·even for a suspect found at 
that location. Moreover, the NIJ formulations were intended to pro-
vide guidelines for postconviction testing of DNA and not to establish 
constitutional standards. ln our view, for the reasons set torth in this 
Article, postconviction access to DNA evidence is constitutionally 
mandated in any case in which DNA tests could either ( 1) definitive1y 
demonstrate innocen~~· or (2) ~rovide substantial grounds for a claim 
i!ll 
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 4-6. 
2!> 
fd. at35. 
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of innocence sufficient to permit the defendant to pursue postconvic-
tion or habeas relief.~ · 
Many prosecutors, even without state legislation, have adopted 
standards similar to those promulgated by the Nij's Commission.31 
Some prosecutors have gone further in the proactive use of DNA to 
assure the integrity of the criminal justice system. A leader in this ap-
proach has been the District Attorney of San Diego who, in July of 
2000, directed a review of the cases of all Cl;lrrently inc~rcerated pris-
oners prosecuted by the offi~e in 1992 or earlier to determine 
whether current DNA technology could provide. ex-::merating evi-
dence.~2 Where the ·District Attorney's case review disclosed the exis-
tence of untested biological evidence that c.ould raise a "reasonable 
probability that, in light of all the. eviden~e, the defe~dant's verdict or 
sentence would have been more favorable if the results had been 
available at the time of conviction,"· the San Diego protocol provides 
for testing of the ~vidence in a fashion mutually agreed upon by the 
!10 As a shorthand, we will use the term "demonstrate innocence~ to ·refer to evi-
dence that would meet either prong. . 
" See, e.g., Mar:k Hansen, DNA Reviews Afoot, A.B.A. J., Ap,r. 2001, at 4op, 40 (~Prose­
cutors in several jurisdictions, from Long Island, N.Y., to Austin, Texas, will allow any 
inmate who requests it access to DNA evidence that could establish his or her inno-
cence. "); Steve Berry, Cooley's First Year Products Few Highs or Lo~s, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2001, at B2 (describing Los Angeles County's forensic science section, wltich "stream-
line[sJ testing requests from inmates who claim they are innocent"):joe Lambe, Inmate 
Wins Fight to Obtain DNA Test, KAN. CllY STAR, Mar. 11, 2000, at A1 ("Jackson County 
Prosecutor Bob Beaird offered to provide evidence in the ca&e for ll DNA ~est. 'He may 
not have a dear legal right,' Beaird said, 'but he has a dear moral right.' Beaird said 
he would allow defense lawyers to obtain tests in cases with critical DNA evidence."); 
Paula McMahon, Slate High Court Won't Extend DNA Tuting, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauder-
dale). Oct. 19, 2001, at lA (uThe BroWllrd Stare Attorney's Office has agreed to do 
DNA testing in all Death Row cases where the inmate has requested it.");Jonathan D. 
Rockoff, I 989 M1trder Case Puts DNA to the Test in R.I., PROVIDENCE J.·BULL, June 25, 
2001, at AI (''[Rhode Island Atton1ey General's guidelines] order a prosecutor tore-
view each request for DNA testing with the defense lawyer making ~e request. If test-
ing is warranted, they would meet with a forensic DNA expert to determine the kind of 
test."); Telephone Interview with Mitchell Morri$$Cf, Chief Deputy District Attorney, 
Denver, Colo. (Apr. 29, 2002) (on file with the authors) (describing the District Attor-
ney's office policy of allowing postconviction testing upon request where evidence 
could prove exculpatory). 
~~ Special Directive from Gregory Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, Office of 
the District Attorney, County of San Diego, to all District Attorney Staff 2 (July 13, 
2000) (on file with the authors); seeJ. Harry Jones, DNA May Shtd New Light on Old Case: 
DA Program Is Reviewing Man:~ Murder Conviction, SAN DIEGO UNION-TR.IB., Apr. 8, 2002, 
at Al ("Almost 600 cases have been scrutinized, with three qualifying for further inves-
tigation .... "). After 1992, DNA testing was routinely utilized before trial in San Di-
ego. Jd. 
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prosecutor's office and defense counsel.!!., George "Woody" Clark, one 
of the architects of the program, commented, "[W]e're hopeful that 
there aren't many cases.... [N]onetheless, we think it's so impor-
tant ... to our community that if it costs that money ... then we're 
willing to spend it .... ""' 
In Minnesota, Ramsey County Prosecutor Susan Gaertner adopted 
the San Diego model to review cases prosecuted before 1995, com-
menting: "'As prosecutors, we have an ethical duty to seek the truth 
and ensure thatjustice is done in every case .... We don't want an 
innocent person behind bars any more than defense attorneys do. If a 
mistake has been made, DNA technology can help to establish the 
truth . .,,:!! Similar reviews have been undertaken by district attorneys in 
Brooklyn;!lll Suffolk County, New York;~7 Nevada;~ Austin, TexastJ and 
59 
Special Directive from Gregory Thompson, supra note 32, at 3. 
54 
NBC Toda.J: Woody Clarlr, San DU!gn Deputy District Att~, Discusses San Diego 
Prosecutors Offering Free DNA Testing to Inmates (NBC television broadcast, July 28, 2000). 
:!! 
Paul Gustafson, DNA Tests May Help Inmates Prove lnnocmce; Ramsey County Is Re-
viewing Old Convictions to See if New Tests Might Change Outcomes, STAR TRIB. (Minneapo-
lis), Mar. 2, 2001, at IB (quoting Susan Gaertner). 
3tl See Daniel Wise, Brooklyn Prosecutors Find Convictions Pass DNA Test, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 
6, 2001, at I (describing &rooklyn District Attorney's review of 703 cases in search for 
exonerating DNA evidence). However, the review program (at last repon} had uncov-
ered no erroneous convictions: 
/d. 
In 403 (or 57 percent) ofthe 703 cases reviewed so far, the office concluded 
that the testing of DNA evidence, even if it were available, would offer no 
hope of exonerating an inmate. In another 266 cases (or 38 percent), no fo-
rensic evidence that might yield DNA evidence w-...s discovered. And in 21 
cases where forensic evidence was tested-all of them sex crimes--no genetic 
material was identified. 
The bottom line is that of the 703 cases reviewed to date, only two are still 
being actively examined .... 
57 
See Tina Kelley, L.l. Prosecutor to Review Cases that DNA Tests Could Reverse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at 85 (reporting on the Suffolk County District Attorney's deci-
sion to review convictions using DNA evidence). 
58 
See Glenn Puit, Prosecutors .Examining Need. Jar DNA Testing in Murder Cases, LAs 
VEGAS REv.:J., Sept. 16, 2001, at 18 (discussing decision of the Southern Nevada Dis-
trict Attorney's office to evaluate whether DNA testing is warranted for past capital 
murder cases). The article went on to report: 
/d. 
[T]he district attorney's office has implemented a protocol for scrutinizing all 
60 of Southern Nevada's capital murder cases to see if DNA testing could have 
made a difference in the outcome .... 
"If there is someone in prison that doesn't belong there, we want them out 
as much as anyone else,* District Attorney Stewart Bell said. 
" See Ed Timms, Travis Completing DNA Review; Wrongful Convictions Prompted In-
quiry, Unprecedented in Texas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 24, 2002, at 45A (describing 
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Oklahoma County, Oklahoma.•0 Other offices voice sympathy for 
such "innocence projects" but assert that they are faced with signifi-
cant competing considerations of cost or other priorities!1 
In September 2000, Orange County, California, District Attorney 
Tony Rackauckas initiated a program that issued notices in English 
and Spanish to California prisoners in thirty-three prisons, inviting 
them to submit applications for forensic testing if they believed that 
testing could exonerate them. Upon receipt of an application with a 
plausible claim, the district attorney's office places a hold on physical 
evidence in the criminal justice system and convenes a review process 
Travis County District Attorney's decision to review 450 cases to ascertain whether 
DNA evidence could be exculpatory). The program in Austin also yielded very few ap-
plications of testing: 
!d. 
Faced with every prosecutor's nightmare-a succession of defendants in 
high-profile cases who seJVed time for crimes they didn't commit-Travis 
County District Attorney Ronnie Earle took an unusual step 1 I /2 years ago. 
His office began a review of old cases in which DNA evidence might be 
available to determine whether other defendants were wrongfully convicted. 
"We wanted to make sure that, insofar as it was possible for us to ascertain, 
that had not happened to anybody else," Mr. Earle said. 
A panel ... focused their [sic] attention on 450 convictions before the 
mid-1990s .... [It] has identified three cases that merited DNA testing of the 
388 cases reviewed so far. 
40 See Good Muve: DNA Testing Project Under Way, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 15, 2002, at 
AS (noting Oklahoma County District Attorney's decision to review old cases to see if 
DNA testing might make a difference). 
In Oklahoma, the review followed a scandal in which police forensics peljury 
tainted the convictions of hundreds of Oklahoma inmates. See Arnold Hamilton, 
Chtmisl's E:rrtm Slir Fear: Wtrt lnnocmt &eculed7 Questions Forr:e Oklahoma to Dig Through 
1,197 Casf.s, DAU.AS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2001, at JA ("Earlier this year, an FBI 
re·.iew of eight cases revealed significant flaws in [the chemist's] analysis. Since ther:, 
state lawmakers provided $650,000 for DNA testing, and Gov. Frank Keating ordered 
the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation to review all criminal cases involving [the 
chemist]."); see also Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.M 1036, 1044 (lOth Cir. 2001) (describ-
ing a federal district court's grant of relief on rape and forcible sodomy convictions 
because of errors in the expert testimony of Oklahoma's forensic chemist). 
•• Sa Telephone Interview with Mitchell MorriSlley, supm note 31 (de3cribing Mor-
rissey's desire to implement a program similar to tht one in San Diego despite the lack 
of time to devote to the project); cf. Laura Bauer Menner, Counliu, ln17UJJ.es Receive Aid 
Payingfur Pricey Tests, SPlUNGFIELD NEws-LEADER (Mo.), Oct. 21, 2001, at lOA (quoting 
district attorneys who had hoped to use a now-revoked federal grant proposal to pro-
vide postconviction DNA testing); Richard Willing, Inmate Genelic Testing Scrapped. USA 
TODAY, Dec. 26, 2001, at lA (reporting Ramsey County, Minnesota, Prosecutor's dis-
appointment in the justice Department's decision not to provide grants for testing 
convicted rapists and murderers who claimed to have been wrongfully identified, and 
providing her statement that "[m]aintaining public confidence in our criminal justice 
system through DNA is apparently not on [Attorney General] Ashcroft's screen"). 
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that includes evaluations by a joint panel of representatives of the dis-
trict attorney's office and the defense bar.4~ According to District At-
torney Rackauckas, '"[I]f there's anybody' who's been wrongfully im-
prisoned, and is sitting there in prison, and his or her case could be 
proven innocent, it's worth this entire project."'4~ A similar program 
involving a joint review by prosecutors and defense attorneys is un-
derway in Los Angeles. 44 
Not all government officials, however, manifest unalloyed enthu-
siasm for testing to exculpate the wrongfully convicted. The National 
District Attorneys Association (NOAA), while avowing support for "the 
use of DNA testing where such testing proves the actual innocence of 
a previously conVicted individual," hedges that support with an admo-
nition that "post-conviction relief remedies should protect against po-
tential abuse and ... should be subject to limits on the period in 
which relief may be sought."4D According to the position paper, these 
limits should be determined "at the state or local level, where deci-
sions can reflect the needs, resources and concerns of states and 
communities. "4n 
42 In cases handled initially by private counsel, a representative of the public de-
fender takes part in the review; in cases handled by public defenders, a private defense 
attorney sits on the review panel. Telephone Interview with Camille Hill, Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney and Projec[ Coordinator, Orange County, Cal, (Apr. 30, 2002) (on file 
with authors); see Stuart Pfeifer, Team Gd.s 80 Requ.ests !.hat Convictions Bt! Reuinlltd, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at Bl (describing panels, composed of prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, that are reviewing convictions). 
4~ Cathy Franklin, fnno«nu Proj«t, CI1Y NEWS SERVICE, Sept 20, 2000, lEX IS, CNS 
File; SH Stuan Pfeifer, O.C Ai111.f tri Unearlh Wrongful Con11ictio1Lf, L.A. TIMES (Orange 
Coumy Ed.), Sept. 2 J, 2000, at Al (reporting Orange County Sheriff's Department lab 
director F:llnk. Fitzpatrick's assertion that DNA testing would cost $2500 per test, but 
*[i]t's a worthwhile expense ... because it ~::ould help free an inno~::ent man and per-
haps identify a criminal who has gone unpunished"). 
44 
See Anna Gorman, Taking a Nt!W Look at Old Gases with DNA, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
2001, at 82 ("[Assistant District Attorney Lisa] Kahn has also started a post-conviction 
team to handle requests from convicted felons who claim they are innocent .. ; . The 
post-conviction, or innocence, project consists of Kahn and three defense attorneys, 
including Deputy Public Defender Jennifer Friedman."). 
·~ .NAT'L DIST. AITOil~EVS Ass'N, POLICY POSITIONS ON DNA TECHNOLOGY 8-9 
(2001 ), http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/7.22.0 I.DNA%20Policy%20Position.pdf. 
~ !d. at 9. The NOM policy reiterates the suggestion that "DNA testing, in most 
cases, should be afforded only where such testing was not previously available to the 
defendant," and five tim.es stresses the need for postconviction testing programs to ad-
here to principl~s of "finality." /d. at 8. While the NOM policy "supports the deci-
sions of individual ,prosecution offices to initiate post-conviction DNA testing pro-
grams," it cautions that such programs "should recognize the need for finality" and 
that they are "not the best approach for all offices." /d. at 10. It goes on to advance 
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In 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a program 
that would have financed postconviction DNA testing, but it has since 
withdrawn this funding.17 Attorney General Aspcroft•has -renounce9. 
any intent to reinstate the program.48 
Prosecutors have sought to narrowly constrain the availability of 
postconviction DNA testing, citing financial concems,49 the need for 
finality in the criminal justice system,00 the need to protect the system 
of plea bargaining, 51 and the specter of a wave of.frivolous requests.~' 
the proposition that "[l]aw enforcement should be permitted to destroy biological 
samples from closed cases" with notice to defendants. !d. at 9. 
47 The Department of Justice announced initially that the $500,000 (later in-
creased to $750,000) of budgeted funding had been divertkd by the Natiohal Institute 
of Justice to assist in the use of DNA technologies to identify victims of the World 
Trade Center attack on September 11. ,Willing, supra note, '!!:1; cf. id .. (noting that Jus-
tice Department sources report NIJ has played only "a limited role in identifying bod-
ies in New York"). · 
In correspondence to Senator Patrick Leahy, the Justice Department identified 
four programs to which the $750,000 funding was diverted: an "expert panel" that met 
monthly to consult with New York officials; "consultant fees" to a computer expert who 
"consulted with the panel"; a pamphlet called "How DNA Can Help Identify lndividu· 
alsn; and a project entitled "Innovative Hybridization DNA Typing for Forensic Appli-
cations; which, "if successful,w would be of use in future mass disasters. Letter from 
Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to 8_enator Patrick J. Leahy (Feb. 25, 
2002) (on file with authors). 
48 
In response to Senator Leahy's question, "How is it that the Department cannot 
find $750,000 in a $30.2 billion budget" to fund postconvidion testing, Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft responded that "the Department does not plan to undertake a national 
effort to promote and fund post-conviction DNA." S« Facsimile from Manu Bhardwaj, 
to Tara Magner &:Julie Katzman (Apr. 24, 2002) (on file with authors) (outlining Ash-
croft's response to Leahy's question). · 
4~ Sa, *.g., Letter from Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida House of Representa· 
tives, to the Florida Supreme Court 3 (Aug. 14, 2001) (opposing extension of DNA 
testing because of "unknown and potentially significant fiseal impact" on the state's 
budget), http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/flsupct/scOl-363/commentlO.pdf; All Things 
Considered: 1"M Right to DNA Testing (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 17, 2001) (paraphras• 
ing Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy for Law of the Philadelphia District Attorney's office, as 
saying, "[G]iven the limited resources of prosecutors and forensic scientists who test 
the DNA, it's not fair to move convicted felons to the front of the line"), http:// 
discover.npr.org/f~atures/featureJhtml?wfld=ll21639. . 
!til See, e.g., In rt Braxton, 258 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2001) (reviewing the argu· 
ment by the warden of the Sussex State Prison in Virginia that disclosure of postconvic-
tion DNA evidence would wreak "undeniable damage to federalism and finality"); Let· 
ter from Tom Feeney, supra note 49, at 4 ("The ability to reopen pleas, years later, on 
evidentiary issues, greatly compromises the interest in finality that is essential to the 
continued operation of our criminal justice system."). As was recently reported in Lou· 
isiana: 
Pete Adams, executive director of the [Louisiana] District Attorneys Associa-
tion ... said the state cannot be forced· to pay for legitimate errors in the legal 
system. 
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Resistance to DNA testing is sometimes couched in sporting 
metaphors1" or grounded in an unshakable belief in the accuracy of 
"If the DA does a job within his scope of duties, and the police do theirs, 
then through an innocent mistake the wrong guy is incarcerated ... why 
should the person be compensated?~ .... 
. . . "I don't want to appear callous, but when you're making public policy, 
you're setting precedent for the future." 
Tom Guarisco, Compensation Sought for Ex-Inmate, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), May 23,2001, 
at lB. 
61 See Response Brief of Amicus Curiae Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, 
Jnc. at 8, Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA 
Testing), 807 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2001) (Nos. SCOl-363 &: SCOl-1649), http:// 
www.law.fsu.edu/library/f1supct/sc01-363/comment4.pdf (opposing postconviction 
testing for defendants who pled guilty because "[t]o allow a [d]efendant to rescind his 
or her plea after this exhaustive effort makes a mockery of our judicial system ... [and 
to allow such defendants to obtain postconviction testing] would make our system 
meaningless, and fraught with fraud"). We wonder whether allowing the continued 
incarceration of factually innocent defendants who pled guilty might not also "make[] 
a mockery of our judicial system." 
~2 See, e.g., Braxton, 258 F.3d at 259 (concluding that, although the warden argues 
that a testing order will "open the tloodgates," he "offers no support for th[at) stark 
assertion"); Tom Campbell, DNA Rdest Not Blocked, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 
10, 2001, at 85 (reporting the view of the Virginia Attorney General that releasing 
DNA evidence would be improper because the "finality of a criminal trial and verdict 
should be maintained" and to do otherwise risks opening the floodgates to "a host of 
similar ill-advised demands"); Brooke A. Masters, TUJ(J Conservative jurists Back DNA Test· 
ing, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at A7 ("Joshua Marquis, an Oregon prosecutor and 
board member of the National District Attorneys Association, warned that inmates 
would abuse a blanket rule on DNA testing .... '(l)t's dangerous when the courts say, 
"This is really cool, and therefore we're going to raise it to a constitutional right."'"); 
Amy Upshaw, judge Thinks Retroactive Gmetic-Testinr lAw Is Constitutiona~ ARK. 
DEMOCRA."f-GAZETI'E, Feb. 16, 2002, at 81 (quoting Pulaski County Prosecuting Attor· 
ney Larry jegley's justification of his efforts to declare a postcooviction ONA testing 
statute unconstitutional on the grounds that "inmates whose cases have long been 
dosed will take advantage of any opportunity to get a free ride to Little Rock or to do 
something to break up the mundane existence they created for themselves when they 
broke the law"). 
For an interesting pen~pective on the "abuse of testing" argument, compare Toney 
v. Cammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996) (reviewing prosecutors' opposition to 
postconviction DNA testing ordered in a federal habeas case because "granting the 
motion 'would open the flood gates for DNA testing"'), with Tim Bry.Jnt, Innocent Man 
'Elated' to Be Free,· Vows He Won't 'Dwell on the Negative' of 13 Yean in Prison, ST. LoUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, July 17, 1996, at IA (detailing the exoneration of Steven L. Toney, 
who was proven innocent of the rape charges for which he had been sentenced io two 
life sentences). 
55 
All Things Considered: The Right to DNA 1P.sting, supra note 49 (reporting that 
Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy for Law of the Philadelphia District Attorney, suggested that 
"felons can do an end run around the state criminal courts and have their cases re-
opened," and theorized that "they're just coming in and saying, 'Well, let's take a 
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the guilty verdict.54 Prosecutors have attempted to induce defendants 
to waive their rights to the maintenance of DNA evidence5r. and have 
sought to destroy DNA evidence that might exonerate incarcerated 
defendants.r.r. 
While many prosecutors who refuse testing m~y be sincerely con-
cerned with administrative issues or finality, other factors may color 
some decisions. DNA exonerations have disdosed deliberate (and in 
some cases criminal) police and prosecutorial misconduct in obtain-
ing the tainted convictions.r-7 Further, to the extent that DNA exon-
erations reveal systemic flaws in the criminal justice system (e.g., faulty 
eyewitness identifications, false confessions, ineffective defense coun-
sel, and unethical police or prosecutors),!!! some prosecutors may be-
lieve that exonerations undermine the credibility of the system. The 
look.... I rolled the dire at trial and I lost. And now I'm going to try another tac· 
tic"'). . 
~· For example, in Mr. Godschalk's case, after testing DNA evidence provided over 
district attorney opposition that eventually exonerated the defendant. 
the Montgomery County district attorney, Bruce L. Castor Jr., whose office 
convicted Mr. Codschalk, ... refused to let Mr. Codschalk out of prison, sar-
ing he believe[d] that Mr. Codschalk [was] guilty and that the DNA testing 
[was] flawed. 
Asked what scientific lY.LSis he had for concluding that the testing was 
flawed, Mr. Castor said in an interview today: "I have no scientific basis. I 
know because I trust my detective and my tape-recorded confession. There· 
fore the results must be flawed .... " 
Rimer, supra note 12; if. Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828, 836 (S.D. Ind. 
2000) (stating that after postconviction DNA testing exonerated the defendant, the 
state "clung to th[e) theoretical possibility" of a theory "completely inconsistent with 
the theory of the case that the prosecution presented to the jury"); id. at 840 ("[N]o 
one should be sentenced to 60 days in prison, let alone 60 years, on the theory and 
evidence the state relies upon in this case to keep jerry Watkins in prison."). 
~ .w Lauren Kern, Waivering Rights: Art Prosecutors Cin;wnventing tlu New Law De-
signed to Prtsert.Je DNA EvidenceP, Hous. PRESS, July 12, 2001, LEXIS, HOUPRS File 
("The passage of the DNA bill and other judicial reforms prompted D.A. Chuck 
Rosenthal to tell the Houston Chronicle, 'This session is going to rank among the 
wont in 25 years."'); id. (noting that the district attorney's office proceeded to "craft[] 
a waiver that [sought) to have defendants sign away their rights-not just to the pres-
ervation of biological evidence but also to any notice of its destruction and to any re· 
lated objections in the future"). 
so; SeeCherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756,782 (E.D. Va. 2000) (recounting the 
prior destruction of DNA evidence at the direction of the state Attorney General's of-
fice and issuing an order forbidding the destruction of evidence in light of "the Com-
monwealth's history of destroying evidence"). 
!•
7 
SIM DWYER, NEUFELD&: SCHECK, supra note 20, at 172-82 (discussing instances of 
"broken oaths~ by police and prosecutors). 
" See id. at xv ( .. Sometimes eyewitnesses make mistakes. Snitches tell lies. Confes-
sions are coerced or fabricated. Racism tntmps the truth. Lab tests are rigged. De-
fense lawyers sleep. Prosecutors lie."). 
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State of Virginia has opposed making DNA evidence available for test-
ing that might exonerate two men the State has already executed. In 
one case, the state Attorney General's office argued that "[c]ontinual 
reexamination of concluded cases brings about perpetual uncer-
tainty ... and disparages the entire criminal justice system. ,59 In the 
other, the argument was less ornate: if the testing proved exculpatory, 
argued the prosecutor, it "would be shouted from the rooftops that 
the [C]ommonwealth ofVirginia {had] executed an innocent man."60 
The prosecutor in Bruce Godschalk's case reported that he was 
"urged by colleagues across the country" to refuse requests for DNA 
testing; fellow district attorneys "did not want him to set a precedent 
by voluntarily releasing evidence."61 As he put the matter, "[t]here is a 
feeling among prosecutors that the integrity of convictions ought to 
stand unless there is some reason to think the conviction might not be 
good."ro2 Thus, it is not uncommon for convicted individuals to find 
themselves in a "Catch-22," where the only road to a showing of inno-
cence leads through DNA evidence in the possession of the prosecu-
tor, and the prosecutor refuses to allow access to the evidence in the 
absence of proof of innocence.r'' 
~~ Brooke A. Masters, NI!W DNA TeJting Urged in Case of Executed Man, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 28, 2001, at 81 (omission in original) (quoting Virginia Senior As~istant Attorney 
Gener.tl Katherine Baldwin's argument in opposition to a petition by four newspapers 
and a charity to obtain DNA evidence that could exonerate Roger Coleman, who had 
been executed ten years earlier); Set! Frank Green, DNA TtiSts Not Ukely Ajltrr an &ecu-
tion; Va. Dpposi·ng Third Request of Its Kind, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 2001, at Al 
(quoting Virginia Attomey General's spokespe1"SOn that testing after Roger Coleman 
had been executed "shows disresPect for the finalitv of convictions and undemtines 
our criminal justice S}'lltem"). Th~ Supreme Court ~fVirginia subsequently held that 
the newspapers and charity were not entitled to Coleman's DNA evidence. Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, Nos. 012682 & 012683, 2002 Va. LEX IS 156, at *14-
15 (Nov. I, 2002). 
00 
Roger Parloff, Gornr bul Not Forgo~ten, A.\i, LAW.,jan.-Feb. 1999, at 5, 6 (quoting 
Deputy Chief Commonwealth Attorney Albert Alberi's argument in opp~~ition to the 
testing of potentially exculpatory DNA evidence in the case of joseph O'Dell Ill, who 
had been executed in July 1997). 
61 
Ralph Vigoda, Silent Witness, PHll.A. INQUIRER SUNDAY MAc.,june 9, 2002, at 12, 
15. 
62 /d. 
till Nationally, roughly half of the prisonefll exonerated by DNA testing have been 
able to obtain access to DNA evidence with the consent of district attorneys, and half, 
like Bntce Godschalk, have had to litigate to obtain access to the exculpatory evidence 
that set them free. Innocence Project, Causes & Remedies, DNA, at http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/causes/dna.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2002). . . 
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II. DNA EVIDENCE AND ACCESS TO COURTS 
In theory, prisoners in the situations of .Bruce God-;chalk and 
Frank Lee Smith can approach courts with claims that they have been 
wrongfu1ly convicted. In practice, their ability to seek relief from in-
carceration is effectively dependent on access to material in the cus-
tody of the government, for ~ere is no source of DNA evidence other 
than the one that the government has seized. If prosecutors grant ac-
cess to that material, the prisoner may construc:t an effective plea for 
release on the ground that she has been wrong~.dly convicted; by con-
trast, if prosecutors deny access, the prisoner is effectively barred from . 
access to the courts or other tribunals on th.e merits of the case. 
. This control over uniquely determinative physic<1.l evidence places 
prosecutors in DNA cases astride the only av~nue to relief from un-
constitutional impriso.nrpent. When prosecutors arbitrarily deny ac-
cess to that avenue, they implicate a deeply rooted constitutional 
norm: the assurance, as the Court put the matter in Wolff v. McDon-
nelt that "no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the 
judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitu-
tional rights."64 
The right of access to the courts, as the Court recently noted in 
Christopher v. Harhury, stands at the confluence of three lines of doc-
trine.~~.'~ The First Amendment's right to petition for redress of griev-
ances protects access to the .courts; indeed, the Court has recently re-
affirmed that the right to petition courts for redress against 
government wrongdoing is "implied by 'the very idea of a govern-
ment, republican in form.'"00 The Court's equa~ protection jurispru-
64 
118 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). Stt- gtmerally Larry Yackle, Congressional PIJlui!T to Require 
DNA TeJting, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1173, 1180-82 (2001) (discussing the right to post-
conviction testing). The Court has twice recognized during the past Term the consd· 
tutional stature of the right to seek judicial redress for wrongs. BE&: K Constr. Co. v. 
NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2395-96 (2002) (recognizing the constitutional importance of 
the right to seek redress of grievances); Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2185, 
2186 n.12 (2002) (detailing the constitutional roots of the right ofaccess). 
M See Harllury, 122 S. Ct. at 218!5, 2186 n.12 (t:xplaining :that the right of access to 
the courts i!i grounded in the First Amendment Petition' Clau.se, the Due Proces.' 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
00 
BE & K Conslr. Co., 122 S. Ct. at 2396 (quoting United States v. Cmikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 552 (1876)); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) ("[P]risoners 
retain the constitutional right to petition the government ·for the redress of gr:iev-
ances .. , ," (citing johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969))); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
u.s. 517, 523 (1983) c~uke others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition 
the Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of 
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dence treats access to courts as a "fundamental interest" that cannot 
be denied arbitrarily when addressing claims of right over which the 
state exercises a monopoly.n7 Due process has been held to mandate 
access to the courts."); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426, 431 (.1978) (holding that the 
ACLU's participation in the suit invoked the First Amendment right to petition); Cruz 
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,321 (1972) (u[P]ersons in prison, like other individuals, have the 
right to petition the Government for redress of grievances which, of course, includes 
'access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints."' 
(quoting Avery, 393 U.S. at 485)); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
U.S. 508, 513 ( 1972) rPetitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies 
and courts to be heard on applications sought by competitive highway carriers."); Mine 
Workers v. 111. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,222 (1967) ("We start with the premise that the 
right ... to petition for a redress of grievances [is] among the most precious of the lib-
erties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights."); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia e:x: rel. Va. 
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5 (1964) (holding that railroad workers' First Amendment right 
to meet and gain legal assistance "cannot be setiously doubted"); NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 437-38 (1963) (mling that a Virginia law.criminalizing the act of telling 
another person that her legal right~ have been infringed and referring her to certain 
attorneys, such as the NAACP, violates the First Amendment); cJ. Bill johnson's Rests., 
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741, 743 ( 1983) (recognizing a "First Amendment right to 
petition the Government for redress of grievances" but construing that right to ex-
clude "suits based on insubstantial claims"). See generally Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of 
Accf.I'S to Court Under tlte Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO 
ST. LJ 557, 580-96, 625-68 (1999) (exploring the use of the Petition Clause to gain 
access to courts in the first instance);James E. Pfander, Suvereign Immunity and the Right 
to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Govern-
ment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899, 903-62 ( 1997) (discussing the history of the First Amend-
ment right to petition). 
n
7 
See M.L.B. v. S.L:)., 519 U.S. 102, 113, 136 (1996) (extending the Court's "nar-
row category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial proc· 
esses without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees" to parental rights termina-
tion); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971) (holding that the State 
must pmvide record for an indigent defendant); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. · 
458, 458-59 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a transcript needed to perfect an appeal 
must be furnished at state expense to an indigent defendant sentenced to ninety days 
in jail and a fifty-dollar fine lor drunk driving); Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 
192, 192-94 (1966) (per curiam) (holding that a transcript must be furnished at state 
expense to enable an indigent state habeas petitioner to appeal denial of relief); Ri-
naldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) (holding that an indigent's right to a tran-
script at state expense for appeal purposes can apply in civil cases if the interest is suf-
ficiently strong); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708.{)9 (1961) (holding that a filing 
fee to process M.ate habeas application must be waived for indigent prisoner); Burns v. 
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 ( 1959) ("The imposition by the State of financial barriers re-
stricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants has no 
place in our heritage of Equal justice Under Law."); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 
( 1956) ("There is no meaningful distinction between a mle which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies 
the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay 
the costs in advance."); seenl.m Penn~'}'lvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (stating 
that the right of "meaningful access to courts" arises from the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
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that those whom the state seeks to imprison have "meaningful access" 
to courts to challenge their imprisonment.68 All three doctrines are 
invoked when "systematic official conduct frustrates a plaintiff ... in 
preparing or filing suits"; they undergird efforts, like Frank Lee 
Smith's and Bruce Godschalk's, to "place the plaintiff in a position to 
pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition is re-
moved.,.69 
This right of meaningful access to the courts holds special impor-
tance for prisoners. Conviction and incarceration isolate prisoners 
from many of the means to protect rights available to those in society 
at large. Prisoners cannot vote, their communication with the outside 
world is limited, their immediate governors are unresponsive, and 
their opportunities to seek legal or political assistance are constrained 
by the rules of the institutions in which they are incarcerated. The 
opportunity to. seek the protection of the judiciary is often the only 
available mode of redress.70 The possibility of seeking relief from 
these disabilities is focused on the courts: a prisoner who is denied 
the opportunity to seek judicial relief can claim no other forum to 
challenge a wrongful conviction. A state should not be permitted to 
63 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576; see Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1989) ("The 
prisoner's right of access has been described as a consequence of the right to due pro-
cess of law and as an aspect of equal protection.~ (citations omitted)); Walters v. Nat'l 
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985) (discussing First Amendment 
and due process rights of court access); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 
(1971) (holding that the refusal to allow appellants into court for divorce proceedings 
denied them due process); see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. I, 13-17 (1981) (holding 
due process requires that the State must pay for blood grouping tests sought by an in-
digent defendant to enable him to contest a paternity suit). As the Court observed in 
M.L.B., "'due process and equal protection principles converge'~ in these cases. 519 
U.S. at 120 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,665 (1983)). 
69 
Harbury, 122 S. Ct. at 2185-86. The11e claims were distinguished in Harimry from 
the class of claims that seek damage relief for "specific cases that cannot now be 
tried ... no matter what official action may be in the future.~ ld. at 2186. The Harlmry 
Court assumed without deciding that such claims were viable, noting that the clainlS 
had heen sustained only in circuit courts. ld. at 2186 n.9. 
70 See, eg., McCarthy v, Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) ("Because a prisoner 
ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote, the right to file a court action might be 
said to be his remaining most 'fundamental political right, because preservative of all 
rights.'" (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886))); Hudson v. McMil· 
!ian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun.J., concurring) rtnasmuch as one convicted of 
a serious crime and imprisoned usually is divested of the franchise, the right to file a 
court action stands, in the words of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, as his most 'fundamental politi-
cal right, because preservative of all rights."' (citation omitted)); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579 
('The recognition by this Court that prisoners have certain constitutional rights which 
can be protected by civil rights actions would be diluted if inmates, often 'totally or 
functionally illiterate,' were unable to articulate their complaints to the courts."). 
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immunize i£S prison regime from judicial review by the simple expedi-
ent of preventing prisoners from reaching the court. And conversely, 
the availability of review stands as justification for the state's continu-
ing exercise of i£S punitive authority. 
The Court has long held that states may not bolt the door of jus-
tice against those in state custody who seek to challenge the terms of 
their punishment. 71 Half a century ago, Ex parte HuU reviewed a pro-
cedure in which the Michigan prison system allowed the filing of peti-
tions for habeas corpus only when an "institutional welfare office[r]" 
and a "legal investigator to the Parole Board" determined that the pe-
tition was "properly drawn."72 After Michigan authorities refused to 
mail a petition for habeas corpus drawn by Cleio Hull, and then seized 
the petition when Hull attempted to send it to court with his father, 
Hull "prepared another document which he somehow managed to 
have his father ... file" with the United States Supreme Court.T.I In 
response to this final effort, the Court unanimously held the Michigan 
regulation invalid, declaring that "the state and i£S officers may not 
abridge or impair [the] petitioner's right to apply to a federal court 
for a wtit of habeas corpus."74 Shortly thereafter, the Court unani-
mously made clear that prisoners' rights of access to the courts ap-
plied to state as well a, federal postconviction proceedings.'~ 
71 
Unlike the rights of acces.~ to evidence.under Brady v. Maryland reviewed in Part 
Ill below, the right of access to the courts has never been subject to the claim that a 
completed ttial extinguishes the right. Compare infra note 82 (evaluating claims that 
Brady is only a "ttial" right), ruitll ca5es cited infra note!! 133-34 (applying right of access 
to claims for postconviction relief). ' · 
7'l 312 u.s. 546, 548 (i941). 
'1!1 /d. 
74 
Ttl. at 549. 
7~ See Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-58 ( 1942) (stating that a state prison's 
suppression of appeal document.<> would violate the Fourteenth Amendment); see also 
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1969) (ruling that the denial of access to a 
transcript in a second state habeas corpus action was unconstitutional where the "prac-
tical effect den(ied] effective appellate review to indigents"); Long v. Dist. Court, 385 
U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (holding that a state may not effectively deny acce'l-s to haheas re-
lief by denying an indigent prisoner access to a free transcript); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 47'7, 479-81 (1963) (holding that a state may not make the availability of tran· 
sclipt.s to indigent defendants seeking a writ of error coram nobis dependent on the dis-
cretion of the public defender); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding 
that a state may not make habea~ relief available only to those who can pay the neces-
sary filing fee); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 n.J (1945) (noting that a warden's 
refusal to allow prisoners acces.'l to the .courts unless they procured counsel contra· 
venecl E.x parte Huli). 
Then:Justice Rehnquist had previously taken the position in dissent that even a 
right of physical access to the couru arises only by virtue of the preemptive effect of 
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Prisoners like Bruce Godschalk, of course, are not physically pre-
vented from filing court papers seeking release, but the Supreme 
Court has recognized that a theoretical opportunity to petition the 
courts can be made unavailable in practice by government policies 
that burden or effectively prevent the exercise of that right. It has 
thus been the rule for a generation that the government may not 
structure the terms of imprisonment to foreclose "meaningful access" 
to courts.711 
Even the Justices who are skeptical of any affirmative obligation to 
provide meaningful access to the courts acknowledge that due process 
prevents states from arbitrarily obstructing the efforts of prisoners to 
seek redress for wrongful imprisonment, and that an obstruction need 
not be total to be unconsti.tutional.77 Prisoners like Smith and God-
schalk seek no affirmative assistance; they only request that prosecu-
tors not prevent access to evidence in the State's exclusive possession. 
The closest parallel to the problems we address arose in Procunier 
v. Martinez, where the Court invalidated a prison regulation that re-
federal habeas corpus statutes, and is thus· inapplicable to access to state court pro-
ceedings. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 839 (1977) (Rehnquist,j .• dissenting) (argu-
ing that there is no fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts); Cruz v. 
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 325 n.3 (1972) (Rehnquist,j., dissenting) (suggesting that right of 
·access is only a matter of preemption grounded in the federal habeas statute). Such 
an approach would require the reversal of precedents dating back to the mid-l940s 
that ~:rotect access to state habeas proceedings. 
In .Johnson v. Avery, the Court confronted a rule of prison administmtion forbid-
ding prisoners from assisting other prisoners in "preparing writs." 393 U.S. 483, 484 
(1969). Emphasizing the "fundamental importance ofthe writ of habeas corpus in our 
constitutional scheme,~ the Court reasoned that "[s]ince the basic purpose of the writ 
is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom. it is fundamental 
that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints 
may not be denied or obstructed." !d. at 485. Notwithstanding the fact that the ~~a~e 
prisons in Tennessee both permitted prisoners to file their own writs physically unmo-
lested and made available free notarization, id. at 488-89, the Court observed that the 
effect of the prohibition of inmate assistance was to "forbid[] illiterate or poorly edu-
cated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions," id. at 487. The rule was unconstitu· 
tiona! because it "in substance, deprived those unable themselves, with reasonahle 
adequacy, to prepare their petitions, of access to the constitutionally and statutorily 
protected availability of the writ of habeas corpus.H /d. al 489. In Wolff v. MdJrmTIIJll, 
the Court rejected the proposition that the right of access was limited to habeas peti-
tions, recognizing that, like habeas petitions, actions brought under federal civil rights 
statutes "serve to protect basic constitutional rights.~ 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). 
77 
Although Justice Thomas's conc~rrence in Lewis v. Casey expressed "doubts 
about the validity of Bmmds," even he recognized a constitutional barrier to states "im-
posing arbitrary obstacles to attempts by prisoners" to challenge their convictions; he 
approved cases holding that states may not "abridge or impair" or "deny or obstruct" 
the capacity to seek habeas relief. 518 U.S. 343, 365, 379-80 (1996) (Thomas,]., con-
curring). 
570 UNIVI!:RSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA !..A W REVIEW [Vol. 151: 547 
stricted attorney-client interviews with prisoners to members of the 
bar and licensed investigators. 7ll Prisoners theoretically could still con-
sult with counsel, but given the remote location of California penal 
institutions, the regulation in effect inhibited adequate professional 
representation, and thus "imposed a substantial burden on the right 
of access to the courts."19 Although "prison administrators are notre-
quired to adopt every proposal that may be thought to facilitate pris-
oner access to the courts," an examination of the claimed basis for the 
prohibition on paralegals and law students "reveal[ed] the absence of 
any real justification. "HO In a unanimous opinion by Justice Powell, the 
Court declared: 
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a coronary the 
requirement that ptisoners be afforded acces!l to the courts in order to 
challenge unlawfttl convictions and to seek redress for violations of their 
constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable 
opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations 
and pr.tctices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional 
representation or other aspects of the right of access to the cmirts are in-
valid.81 
When the state denies access to DNA evidence that could demonstrate 
innocence, it likewise imposes a substantial burden on the right of ac-
cess to the courts. The situation faced by prisoners seeking access to 
DNA evidence is not one in which the government has exercised its 
power to prevent attorneys from gaining access to prisoners, but one 
in which the state prevents prisoners and their attorneys from gaining 
access to the evidence that may determinatively exonerate them. But 
whether the attorney cannot talk with her client, or cannot examine 
determinative evidence, the effect is equally to obstruct the availability 
of effective access to the courts.s-J 
711 
416 u.s. 396,419 (1974). 
'I'J /d. at 420. 
"" /d. at 42().21. 
HI fd. at4J9. 
11:1 In Part Ill, we address the due proce.s.\ claim to this evidence under Brady v. 
Maryland and its progeny, which establish a right ~o disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 
It is important to note that the claims are constitutionally distinct. The Bmdy line of 
cases focuses on the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to prevent the conviction 
and incarcerdtion of the innocent and to ensure that justice is done in criminal cases. 
In our view, the Bmdy principles apply in the postconviction context with respect to 
DNA evidence. But even if that claim is rejected on the theory that Bmdy is limited to 
the trial context, the right to access to the courts would still provide a viable constitu-
tional claim. 
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The Supreme Court recently reviewed a line of cases in which 
courts held that government officials who concealed, destroyed, or al-
tered evidence to prevent victims of government misconduct from 
claiming relief in court violated the constitutional right of access to 
courts.85 The Court confronted claims by an American citizen that 
U.S. officials had concealed information from her regarding the status 
and whereabouts of her husband in Guatemala and thereby prevented 
her from seeking judicial relief to prevent his torture and execution.111 
Although it denied damages for the deceptions before it because ap-
propriate relief could be awarded in an underlying suit for the mis-
conduct in question, the eight-member majority in Christopher v. Har-. 
bury recognized the strength of the precedents holding that 
concealment or destruction of evidence may amount to a violation of 
the constitutional right of access to courts. !!!I 
The leading case in this line is Bell v. Milwaukee, which upheld a 
·cause of action· for denial of access to the courts against police officers 
who planted a weapon in the hands of their victim, lied, and con-
spired with other officers and the district attorney to cover up their 
killing of an unarmed civilian.•u; Awarding damages to the victim's 
family, whose civil rights action had been thwarted for twenty years by 
the perpetrators' efforts, the court observed: "To deny (judicial] ac-
cess defendants need not literally bar the courthouse door or attack 
plaintiffs' witnesses. This constitutional right is lost where, as here, 
police officials shield from the public and the victim's family key facts 
which would form the basis of the family's claims for redress . ..a' 
8l Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 n.7 (2002). 
84 
!d. at 2181.S3. 
as ld. at 2186-87. Justice Thoma<! filed a lone ronc~rrence in the result, asserting 
that !.he majority's analysis was unnecessary on the ground that he could "find no basis 
in the Constitution for a 'right of access to courts.'" !d. at 2190 (Thomas, j., concur· 
ring). 
86 
746 F.2d 1205, 1260-65, 1279.SO (7th Cir. 1984}, cited in Harbury, 122 S. Ct. at 
2186. 
87 I d. at 126 J. In a similar line of reasoning, the Sixth Circuit stated: 
The right of access in its most formal manifestation protects a person's right 
to ph>·sica!ly access the court system. Without more, however, such an irnpor· 
tant right would ring hollow in the halls of justice. . . . [T]o what avail would 
it be to arm a person with such a constitutional right, when the courtroom 
door can be hermetically sealed by a functionary who destroys the evidence 
crucial to his case. 
Swek.el v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Harrell v. 
Cook, 169 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[O]estruction of evidence can sabotage a 
case just as effectively as the conduct described in Bel~ if it effectively deprives the 
plaintiff of essential proof."); Oelew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998) 
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A prosecutor's office that seizes and withholds potentially exculpa-
tory DNA samples does not orchestrate a malign conspiracy.· But its 
policy deprives prisoners of access to crucial evidence, thus denying 
the opportunity to present claims of innocence. 
There are, of course, limits on the obligation of the government 
to facilitate challenges to custody. The government need not gather 
evidence in the first instance,!§~ and need not provide counsel in post-
conviction proceedings.119 In Bounds v. ·Smith, however, the Court 
traced decisiops "requir[ing] remedial measures to insure that inmate 
access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful," and con-
cluded that states are required to "shoulder affirmative obligations to 
assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts."90 In particular, 
the Court held that for prisoners "seeking new trials, release from 
confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights,"91 the access 
right required that prison regimes make available law libraries or 
th . I '!)! o er equ1va ent measures: 
Prisoners' rights have not been favorites of the Rehnquist Court, 
and the level of "affirmative obligation" that the access right imposes 
has been a matter of controversy. · In Lewis v. Casey, the Court over-
("[T)he defendant:; violated the [plaintiffs'] right of meaningful acces.'l to the courts by 
covering up the true facts surrounding (the death of one of the plaintiffs]."); Nielsen 
v. Clayton, Nos. 94-1620,94-1765 & 94-1766, 1995 U.S. App. LEX1S 17126, at *19 (7th 
Cir. July 11, 1995) (holding that a violation of the right of access to the courts may ex-
ist even if a party has successfully accessed· a court, if that access was ineffective due to 
concealment of the fact~); Chrissy F. v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 851 
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a child's allegations that the welfare department failed to 
report her repeated statements that she had been sexually abused could state a valid 
claim of denial of access to the courts); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 974-75 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that the eleven-month concealment alleged in the complaint was 
sufficient for a jury to find a denial of constitutional rights). But 5ee Vasquez v. Her-
nandez, 60 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that not every deception rises to the 
level of a constitutional violation). 
The position of Judge King, concurring in Haro9 v. Horan that the access claim 
was barred because, "even without access to the evidence, [the prisoner] is fully capa-
ble of taking advantage of postconviction legal options such as habeas corpus and 
clemency.~ 278 F.3d 370,386 (4th Cir. 2002) (King,J., concurring), adopts a formalis-
tic aerroach to the right of access that is wholly at odds with the case law . 
• V.11 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) ·(holding that police 
had no duty to preserve breath samples taken to establish a Dwt violation). 
"'' See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. l, 10 (1989) (holding that the right to ap-
pointed counsel extends only to the first appeal, even when the death penalty is im· 
posed); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding that the right to ap-
pointed counsel extends no further than the first appeal). 
!MI 430 u.s. 817,822,824 (1977). 
'" !d. at827. 
~J'l 
!d. at 826-30. 
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turned a lower. court's decree that relied on earlier access cases to 
guarantee prisoners extensive entitlements to law libraries, law librari-
ans, and legal assistance." The Lewis Court's five-member majority 
disavowed the proposition that states are required to confer "sophisti-
cated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely 
illiterate prison population"94 regarding an unlimited spectrum of 
causes of action, and held that in any event the decree failed because 
no plaintiff had established standing by showing that he had a non-
frivolous claim of systemwide constitutional violation the judicial vin-
dication of which could be facilitated by the claimed relief.95 
Lewis substantially limited the assistance that states must provide 
to inmates, and it imposed the anomalous requirement that inmates 
identify a legal claim before asserting the right of access to legal assis-
tance in order to determine whether they have a legal claim. None-
theless, the Lewis Court reaffirmed the proposition that, for prisoners 
who can identify colorable claims, prison regimes must provide a 
"'meaningful [right of] access to the courts.'"96 It limited that right to 
suits seeking to challenge the fact or terms of a prisoner's confine-
ment "The tools [Bounds] requires to be provided," wrote Justice 
Scalia for the mcyority, "are those that the inmates need in order to 
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to chal-
lenge the conditi?ns of their confinement."97 
93 
518 U.S. 343,346-48 (1996). ~the majority described the decree, it governed 
the times that libra1ies were to be kept open, the number of hours of library 
use to which each inmate was entitled (10 per week}, the minimal educational 
requirements for prison librarians (a library science degree, law degree, or 
paralegal degree), [and] the content of a videomped legal-research course for 
inmates .... With respect to illiterate and non·Engtish-speaking inmates, the 
injunction declared that they were entitled to "direct assismncc" from lawyers, 
pa~legal!' or "a sufficient number of at least minimally trained prisoner Legal 
Asststants .... 
/d. at 347-48 (quoting the injunction issued by the United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona). 
!H /d. at 354. 
9~ /d. at 360. 
:•; ld. at 351 {quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830); see id. at 350 (acknowledging the 
• (already we!!-established) right of access to the courts" (emphasis omitted)). 
97 
/d. at 355; see also Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 n.3 (2001) (w[l)nmates 
have a right to receive legal advice from other inmates only when it is a neces.~ary 
'means for ensuring a "reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations 
of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'"" (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at B50.5J 
(quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825))). 
This limit on the constitutional claims that can command a right of access is con-
sistent both with the Court's historical concern (as a matter of due process) with ensur-
ing that prisoners' claims of abuse are not stiHed by the alleged perpetrators and with 
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Some commentators read Lewis as the beginning of the end of any 
constitutional protection of prisoners' access to the courts.98 They are 
mistaken. The requirement that' plaintiffs demonstrate colorable un-
derlying claims has often stood in the way of broad injunctive relief, 
but it has not eliminated the substantive obligation to allow prisoners 
meaningful access when such claims exist. Lower courts have contin-
ued to find viable causes of action when prison regimes demonstrably 
prevent prisoners from seeking redress from unconstitutional con-
firiements.99 
Regardless of the level of affirmative assistance to which prisoners 
are entitled, under the Court's precedents the government may not 
"unjustifiably obstruct"100 access to judicial relief. When the govern-
ment seizes ·unique and potentially determinative evidence, making it 
unavailable to the prisoner whom it may exonerate, a prosecutor can-
not constitutionally be empowered to deny access to the evidence for 
no reason better than a desire to avoid challenge to the verdict she 
previously won. As we will see in Part IV, a careful examination of the 
justifications for denial of access will often reveal, as in Martinez, an 
"absence of any real justification" for the government's actions.'01 
treating access claims of the civilian population, in cases such as M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 
U.S. 102 (1996), as particularly important for the protection of fundamental rights. 
!Ill See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Ptisonm' Rights: Congress and tile 
Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1262-64 (1998) (discussing the possibil· 
ity that Congress might be able to restrict prisoners' access to the courts for all but the 
"core areas the Court favors"); Christopher E. Smith, The Malleability of Con.ftitulional 
Doctrine and Its Ironic Impact on Prisonm' Rights, ll B.U. Pun. INT. LJ. 73, 90-91 (2001) 
(arguing that the decision in Lewis created a "Catch-22" situation by imposing a strict 
standing requirement that prisoners must first file legal papers to demonstrate they 
Jack the resources and the capability to file such papers). 
ll'J Su. ~.g .. Cody v, Weber, 256 F. 3d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a cause 
of action existed when a prisoner's legal papers were searched and read); Come;.; v. 
Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127·28 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a prisoner's First 
Amendment rights were violated when the Idaho Department of Corrections tried to 
transfer him after he complained about the law library); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 22+25 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding a cause of action when a prisoner was segregated 
from the general inmate population after filing civil right.~ laWlluits); May v. Sheahan, 
226 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a cause of action existed when a pris-
. oner detained in a hospital was prevented from making a court appearance); 
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 395 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a cause of ac· 
tion existed when a prisoner was harassed by prison officials after helping another 
prisoner gain access to the courts); Goff v. Nix, 113 F.&l 887, 892 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a prisoner's rights were violated when his legal papers were taken, 
thereby denying him access to the courts). 
100 
Procunierv. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,419 (1974). 
101 
ld. at 421; see discus.~ion infra Part IV (ev-J.luating the opposing arguments 
grounded in finality, avoidance of administrative burdens, and federalism). 
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Not every claim of access to DNA is constitutionally protected. 
The primary significance of Lewis, as the Supreme Court recently ob-
senred in Christopher v. Harbury, lies in its adoption of the proposition 
that the right of court access is "ancillary to the underlying claim, 
without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out 
of court."102 The plaintiff, therefore, "must identify a 'nonfrivolous,' 
'arguable' underlying claim" that is burdened by the challenged gov-
ernment restriction. 10' In cases like Godschalk and Smith, the underly-
ing claim is one of factual innocence, which may be vindicated either 
in state or federal court if the DNA evidence proves exculpatory. 
The parameters of this "nonfrivolous and arguable" test, which 
senres as the gateway to a right of access, are not clearly articulated ·in 
Harbury, but the language has a striking parallel in the Court's in 
forma pauperis jurisprudence, which permits dismissal only when the 
complaint is factually "frivolous" or without arguable merit as a legal 
matter.104 The well-settled approach to determining frivolousness in 
this context allows a court to "dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only 
if the facts aJleged are 'dearly baseless,' a category encompassing alle-
gations that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and 'delusional. "' 10!; The Court 
has cautioned that an "in forma pauperis complaint may not be dis-
missed ... simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations un-
likely. "106 Some improbable allegations might properly be disposed of 
on summary judgment, but to dismiss them as frivolous without any 
factual development is to disregard the age-old insight that many alle-
gations might be "'strange, but true; for truth is always strange, 
[s]tranger than fiction.'"107 
The stories of Bruce Godschalk and Frank Lee Smith counsel a 
similar caution. It may seem strange that a defendant would confess 
.to a crime he did not commit; it is both strange and unfortunate that 
an eyewitness can identify definitively, under oath, the wrong person 
as an assailant. Yet once DNA evidence is subjected to testing, these 
"strange" claims have been shown to be scientifically and demonstra-
bly true. 
Ul'l Christupher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2186-87 (2002). 
Ia! /d. at2187 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). 
104 
SH 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (i) (2000) (providing for dismissal of fri\'olous 
actions in in fonna pauperis proceedings). 
10~ Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) {quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 
490 u.s. 319,325-28 (1989)). 
100 
I d. at 33. 
107 
/d. (quoting LORD BYRON, Canto XIV, in 3 BYRON'S DON jUAN 410, 455 
(Truman Cuy Steffan&: Willis W. Pratt eds., Univ. ofT ex. Press 1957) (1823)). 
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Denial of access to DNA samples by prosecutors should be subject 
to special scrutiny for a final reason under the Court's right to access 
precedents. The Court has recently emphasized the First Amendment 
concerns that arise when the government can "truncate" the represen-
tation of clients challenging government authority: "We must be vigi· 
lant when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insu· 
late its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge. "109 So, too, Justice 
Harlan observed that a system that gave unreviewable discretion to a 
public defender to deny access to trial transcripts for indigents seek-
ing collateral relief "falls. short of ·the requirements of due process," 
since "[i]t ignores the human equation not to recognize the possibil-
ity" that trial counsel might be reluctant to impeach a verdict in which 
she participated. 100 Given the tenacious belief that prosecutors often 
manifest in the accuracy of the verdicts they have won, it would 
equally "isnore the human equation" to rely entirely on their discre-
tion in granting or denying access to DNA evidence that could dem-
onstrate innocence. 110 
III. DNA EVIDENCE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 
The obligation to allow access to postconviction DNA evidence is 
supported by a second, complementary set of legal principles arising 
out of the constitutional commitment to insuring against miscarriages 
of criminal justice. Altho':lgh most directly addressed to the obliga-
tions of fairness at trial, due process principles that require a prosecu-
tor to disclose exculpatory evidence to accused defendants before 
conviction extend appropriately to access to DNA evidence that could 
demonstrate innocence after conviction. 
IIlii 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001 ). 
100 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963) (Harlan,J., wncurring); see id. (Stew· 
art, J.) ("The provision before wl confers upon a state officer out~ide the judicial sys-
tem Rower to take from an indigent all hope of any appeal at all.~). 
10 CJ. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,450 (1971) (~Without disrespect 
to the state law enforcement agent here involved, the whole point of the basic rule 
[requiring neutral magistrates to issue search warrants] is that prosecutors and po-
licemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to 
their own investigations ... .");Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (hold· 
ing that probable cause must be determined by neutral magistrates and not ujudged by 
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"). 
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A. The Law of Access to Evidence in Criminal Justice 
During the last two generations, t:pe Suprem(! Court has construed 
the Due Process Clause to establish '"what might loosely be called the 
area of constitutionally guaranteed access to eVidence.'" 111 Moving 
from a "gladiatorial" model in which each party was free to withhold 
information from its opponent or the court toward a sys~em in which 
the goal is "ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations,"112 the 
Court has constrained prosecutors' previously unfettered discretion by 
imposing a duty to provide exculpatory evidence to defendants. 
In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, 113 the Court built upon 
J 
the previously established prosecutorial duty to refrain from the know-
ing use of peljured testimony and the deliberat:e suppression of ex-
culpatory evidence,114 and ruled that as a matter of due process a de-
fendant in a criminal case is entitled upon request to disclosure from 
the prosecution of all "favorable" and "material" evidence in the 
State's possession.115 Suppression of such evidence has been recog-
nized as a violation of due process principles, "irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution,"llt' since it ':'ndermines the fair-
ness of the process by which criminal punishment is imposed. The 
"Brady rule" has become a key structural element of modem criminal 
procedure. AJong with significant changes in court rules and statutes, 
·it has supplanted prior adversarial leeway in pretrial disclosures in the 
criminal justice system. 117 
111 
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 5l. 55 ( 1988) (quoti~g United States v. Valen-
zuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)). 
m Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,439-40 (1995). 
n• 37l U.S. 83 (1963). 
114 
SN Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-12 (1935) (holding that the use of 
peljured testimony and suppression of exculpatory evidence amounted to a denial of 
due Rrocess). 
1~ Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
116 /d. 
111 
For early accounts advocating broader pretrial disclosures, see William J. 
Brennan ,Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting /:."vent ur Quest for Truth? A Progress Refmt, 
68 WASH. U. L.Q. I, 15-16 (1990); William J. Brennan, Jr., Th8 Criminal Prosecution: 
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth7, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 282; AbrahamS. Gold3tein, 
'lne State and the Accilsed: Balance of Advantagr in Criminal Prrxtdtm, 69 YALE LJ. 1 149, 
1180-85 (1960); Roger J. Trdynor, CtTOUnd Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 229-30 (1964). But Sf' United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand,j.) (denying the defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury's 
minutes); State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 886-91 (NJ. 1953) (Vanderbilt, CJ.) (holding 
that the defendant did not have the pretrial right to see either the statements of others 
to the prosec:ution or his own confession). In the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials, 
American prosecutors faced the embarrassment of a Soviet protest that American rules 
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In the forty years since Brady, the Court has continued to hold 
that due process does not require the prosecution to disclose all in-
formation in its possession, stressing that the constitutional mandate is 
not a substitute for rules of discovery in criminal cases.1111 On the 
other hand, the cases have defined the concept of "materiality" to 
cover all evidence that is directly exculpatory, impeaching in nature, 
or of a quality that could make a probable difference in the trial's out-
119 come. 
Kyles v. VVhilley 1ro extended Brady to information held by police in-
vestigators but unknown to prosecutors. Like Brady, it was anchored 
in the "early 20th-century strictures against misrepresentation" 121 and 
the "'suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused. "'122 The Court emphasized that Brady was "triggered by the po-
tential impact of favorable but undisclosed evidence. "123 Notwith-
standing the claim that prosecutors had no actual knowledge of the 
evidence at issue, the Court declared that "the prosecutor ha[d] the 
means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility if he 
(would]."124 
of discovery were unfair to defendants. See Hon, Robert H. Jackson, Some Problems in 
Developing an International tegal System, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 147, 150.52 ( 1948) (commenting 
on the validity of the Soviet objections). 
118 
Set United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[The Brady rule's) pur· 
pose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is un-
covered, but to ensure that a miscarriage ofjustic~ does not occur."). Historically, dis-
covery in criminal ca.~s was quite limited. Set~, B. g., Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317 
(4th Cir. 2002) (Luuig,J., concurring) (discussing the traditional adversarial practices 
of ~concealment" and ~g-c~mesmanship"). While modern ntles have generally ex-
panded the scope of discovery, and courts now reject the "sporting theory of justice," 
there is no requirement that all investigative material in the possessiOn of the police or 
prosecutor be disclosed. Judge Luttig suggests that perhapA there should be. See id. 
(Luttig,J., concurring) (explaining that, in cases in which exculpatory evidence would 
prove beyond any doubt the innocence of the defendant, the principle of elementary 
fairness requires post-trial production). 
,,, ~Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-38 (1995) (tracing the history and scope 
of the Brady line of cases); cj United States v. Ruiz, 122 S. Ct. 2450, 2455-57 (2002) 
(finding no due process obligation on the part of the prosecution to disclose "im-
peaching" material prior to entering a plea agreement with the defendant when the 
government has provided all information regarding the defendant's "factual inno-
cence~). 
120 514 u.s. 419 (1995). 
m ld. at432. 
•u /d. (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
IU /d. at 434, 
1
i
4 /d. at 438. 
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Suppression of evidence was held to violate due process principles 
even if there was otherwise sufficient evidence to convict; the prosecu-
tor has the duty to "learn of any favorable evidence known to ... oth-
ers acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the po-
lice. "1~ The Court did not equivocate regarding the purpose and 
expected results of this rule: 
This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking too 
close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence. This is as it 
should be. Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as 
Mthe representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a crimi-
nal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done." And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the 
prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining 
the tmth about criminal accusations.
1211 
· 
Most recently, in United States v. Ruiz., the Court rejected a defen-
. dant's due process-Brady claim that a guilty plea entered without dis-
closure by the prosecution of "impeaching" material rendered the 
plea involuntary.127 As part of a "fast-track" plea bargaining program, 
the government offered certain defendants reduced sentence·recom-
mendations in exchange for a waiver of indictment and trial. 1214 Prose-
cutors committed themselves to disclosing any information relating to 
the factual innocence of the defendant, but did not reveal impeaching 
evidence or material that could support an affirmative defense.121J The 
Court recognized that the due process considerations that support a 
right to exculpatory and impeachment material were directly con-
cerned with assuring a fair trial, but, as in other procedural contexts, 
resolving the question of whether due process mandated disclosure of 
this information required a balancing of the "private interest" at stake, 
the .. value of the additional safeguard," and the "adverse impact ... 
upon the Government's interests. "1ll<l The Ruiz. Court determined that 
any interest on the defendant's side was outweighed by significant 
prosecutorial interests, including the possible disruption of ongoing 
investigations, exposure of witnesses to harm, and the commitment of 
significant reso·urces that might undermine the plea bargaining pro-
12~ /d. at 4!J7. 
120
i /d. at 439-40 {omissions in original) {citations omitted) (quoting Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935)). 
IV 122 s. Ct. 2450, 2453 (2002). 
l:lll ld. 
129 /d. 
150 
I d. at 2456. 
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gram. 1' 1 It is noteworthy that the government assured the Court that it 
would provide evidence of factual innocence, even at the plea stage. 1~ 
In the postconviction context, where a defendant seeks disclosure 
of specifically identifiable DNA material that could demonstrate inno-
cence, the Ruiz balance looks substantially different. As we develop in 
detail below, the interests of the defendant, though surely diminished 
by reason of a criminal conviction, still surpass any countervailing in~ 
terests of the prosecution. Applying Brady, courts have found a post-
conviction right of access to DNA materials in the possession of the 
prosecutor. 1:1S If prosecutors must deliver exculpatory evidence to a 
131 /d. 
132 !d. 
~~~ E ..g., Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 
366, 369-70 (E. D. Pa. 2001) (finding a right to postconviction DNA testing despite the 
defendant's "confession"); Harvey v. Horan, No. 00-1123-A, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9587, at *15-16 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2001) ("[D]enying the plaintiff access to potentially 
powerful exculpatory evidence would result in ... a miscarriage of justice."), rev'd, 278 
F.3d 370 (4th Cir.), mhg denied, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002); Charles v. Greenberg, 
No. 00-958, 2000 U.S. DisL LEXIS 18349, at *12 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2000) (noting that 
the court pr~:viously refused to dismiss the defendant's complaint for injunctive relief 
and that this sparked negotiations between the parties that ultimately led to the defen-
dant's access to the mpe kit and to a finding that he had been wrongfully incarcer· 
ated)i State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793, 806-07 (Conn. 1992) (granting access to DNA 
where there was reason to doubt that the evidence would be cumulative); People v. 
johnson, No. 85134, 2002 Ill. LEXIS 301, at *14 ([II. Apr. 18, 2002) (considering the 
defendant's claim that the United States Constitution mandates access to exculpatory 
evidence on collateral revit:W, but ultimately ordering access to DNA evidence on the 
ba.~is ora state statute); Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (al-
lowing postconviction DNA testing on fundamental fairness grounds); Dabbs v. Ver· 
ga.ri, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that any evidence with "high 
exculpatory potential" !lhould be discoverable after conviction); Commonwealth v. 
Reese. 663 A.2d 206, 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (allowing postconviction DNA testing 
where identification wall at iaue and no other physical evidence connected rhe defen-
dant to the scene); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 423-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992) (allowing postconviction DNA testing with the assumption that the samples still 
exist); cf. Clason v. McKenzie, No. 8:02CV206, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13044, at *10 (D. 
Neb. july 12, 2002) (gnmting acceSII to DNA samples to test origin of inculpatory urine 
in parole revocation proceeding); Lee v. Clark County Dist. Attorney's Office, 145 F. 
Supp. 2d 1185, 1188 (D. Nev. 2001) (abstaining from adjudication of access com-
plaint). But see State v. Frazier, No. 30805884Dl, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 474, at *14 
(Aug. 3, 199!\) (~ro general, there is no O;lnstitutional right to DNA testing .... "); 
State v. El-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 747-48 (Neb. 2000) (denying postconviction DNA 
testing because ~there is no existing procedureM to permit testing and ~there is no con-
stitutional right to testing"). 
Court.~ have held that, as of 1994 and 1997, there was not a "dearly established" 
right to DNA testing. See Harrison v. Abraham, No. 964262, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6894, at *53 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1997) (granting qualified immunity to police officers 
who had a duty to provide evidence to the prosecutor and not the defendant); Roberts 
v. Toal, No. 94-CV-0608, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1836, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1997) 
2002] DOUBLE HEUX, DOUBLE BIND 581 
defendant before trial even without request, they should at least be 
obligated to provide access to evidence that could prove innocence 
post-trial upon specific request of the convicted defendant.1s1 
(granting qualified immunity in damages claim by exonerated plaintiff, but noting that 
defendants did not afthmatively deny access to tests); Brison v. Tester, No. 94-2256, 
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18193, at "'4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1994) (granting qualified immu-
nity in damages claim by exonerated defendant). 
Student commentators have uniformly approved the extension of Bmdy to post-
conviction production of DNA samples. See, e.g., Jennifer Boerner, Student Article: 
Other Rising Legal Issues, In the Interest of justice: (.ranting Post-Conviction DeoxyriiHJnu-
cleic Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1971, 2001 (2001) (con-
cluding that there are no justifications for barring postconviction DNA testing); 
Cynthia Bryant, Note, Wilen O'M Man's DNA Is Another Man 's Exonerating l:.."viclence: Com-
pelling Consensual Sexual Pannm of Rape Victims to Provide DNA Sf~mples to Postconviction 
Petitioners, 33 CoLUM. J.L. &: Soc. PROBS. 113, 122-25 (2000)' (explaining the difficulties 
in obtaining postconviction testing· through standard procedural methods); Donna 
Buchholz, Comment, Modem Day Chliteau D'Ifin Horida1 Collecting Dust on tiUI SIUilves of 
Justice: Potentially Exculfmtury DNA /:.vidence Waits for a Turn in the Horida Sunshine, 30 
STETSON L. REV. 391, 423-26 (2000) (urging that the quest for truth should be par.t· 
mount in postconviclion evidentiary disputes); Christian, supra note 25, at 1240-41 (ar-
guing that the potential exculpatory value of DNA trumps finality concerns); David 
DeFoore, Comment, Postcunviction DNA Testing: A Cry for justice from the ~ongly Con-
vided, 33 TEX. TECH L. REv. 491, 525-27 (2002) (listing concerns that legislators should 
address in fashioning appropriate remedies); Developme'ftts in the l..artJ-Cunjrrmting the 
New Challenges of Scientific f.-vidence, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1481, 1572-73 ( 1995) (describing 
the resistance that defendanL'I have met in seeking postconviction DNA testing). Pro· 
fessor Yackle has also argued that DNA's dispositive quality may compel postconviction 
testing. See Yackle, ~upra note 64, at 1180-82 (arguing that DNA's dispositive quality 
makes its use constitutionally compelling) .. 
tM Indeed, precedent supports an affirmative disclosure obligation when exculpa-
tory evidence surfaces after conviction. See Monroe v. Rlackbum, 476 U.S. 1145, 1149 
(1986) (Marshall, .J., dissenting) ("It would hardly make sense to hold the State to a 
spelial duty to disclose exculpatory c•idence in any advenarial proceeding and then 
permit the State to avoid this obligation by suppressing the very evidence that would 
enable a detendant to trigger such proceedings."); see also Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 824, 849 n.15 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (recognizing district court opinions extending 
the Brady obligations through proceedings for post-trial motions); Monroe v. Butler, 
690 F. Supp. 521,525 (E.D. La. 1988) (rejecting, on remand, the argument that Brady 
is limited to preconviction proces.ses). 
The Court's balancing of the SLate's interests and private interests in Ruiz, 122 S . 
. Ct. at 2453, point!l in the same direction. Even when physical evidence does ool by it· 
self demonstrate innocence in particular cases, the balance could mandate disclosure 
when the burdens on the prosecution are negligible and the probative force of the 
evidence is powerful but not determinative. The recent developments in the Central 
Park jogger case in New York City exemplify such a situation. See Robert D. McFadden 
&: Susan Saulny, DNA in Central Park jogger Case spurs Call for New Review, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2002, at 81 (discussing DNA evidence that implicated a new suspect who con-
fessed to the crime but would not determinatively exculpate the five men convicted of 
the rctpe). 
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Recently in Ha'TVf:J v. Horan, 15~. both the procedural and substantive 
aspects of the Brady postconviction DNA disclosure claim generated 
vigorous debate among the judges of the Fourth Circuit. A majority of 
the panel that initially heard argument determined that the case was 
procedurally barred!sa A concurring judge would have held for the 
plaintiff on the procedural issues but found the Brady theory inappo-
site.157 The plaintiff's application for rehearing was ultimately mooted 
because Virginia adopted a statutory right to DNA testing; however, 
judge Luttig wrote a comprehensive concurring opinion supporting 
the prisoner's constitutional claim, concluding: 
[A]t least where the government holds previously-produced forensic evi-
dence, the testing of which concededly could prove beyond any doubt 
that the defendant did not commit the crime for which he was con-
victed, the very same principle of elemental fairness that dictates pre-trial 
production of all potentially exculpatory evidence dictates post-trial pro-
duction of this infinitely narrower category of evidence. And it does so 
out of recognition of the same systemic interests in fairness and ultimate 
truth. 1 :~~~ 
It is our view that judge Luttig and the cases that adopt this. theory are 
entirely correct. Although the problem of DNA evidence requires ap-
plication of due process principles in a new context, neither the fact 
that untested DNA evidence is indeterminate, nor the fact that the 
prisoners have already been convicted dissipates the mandate of due 
process that the government make the evidence available where it 
could demonstrate innocence. 
B. Brady and Untested bvidence 
Brady itself concerns evidence whose meaning is known to prose-
cutors and whose exculpatory qualities can be evaluated directly by a 
reviewing court. It thus differs from untested DNA evidence whose 
evidentiary import is indeterminate. In a series of cases applying the 
Brady rule, however, the Court has faced the issue of the due process 
IS! 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir.), t-eh'gdenitd, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002). 
t!ltl S~e id. at 379 (Wilkinson, CJ.) (dismissing prisoner's action ~as a successive 
(habeas] petition brought without leave of courtw). The opinion also expressed the 
view that the grant of testing was substantively improper, a view which appears techni-
cally to be dicta. But see Harvt!J, 285 F.3d at 31 J-12 nn.2-3 (Luttig,J., concuning) (in-
terpreting this view as a holding}. 
'" See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 385 (King,J., concurring) (finding that prisoner was not 
denied access to B-rady material). · . 
1~ Harvt!J, 285 F.3d at 317 (Luttig,J., concuning). 
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implications of potentially favorable evidence whose actual meaning is 
unknown because it has been lost, destroyed, or withheld. These cases 
do not abandon the basic Brady rule, but tailor it to assure that the 
search for truth is not abandoned in the face of uncertainty. 
In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernat the government had deported 
potential witnesses in a criminal case (passepgers in the defendant's 
car) when the defendant was prosecuted for· criminal transportation 
of aliens. 1311 The defense had no opportunity to investigate their po-
tential usefulness or to preseiVe their testimony for trial. 140 The gov-
ernment made what the Court characterized as a "good-faith determi-
nation that they possess[ed] no evidence favorable to the defendant 
in a criminal prosecution,"•~• and argued that immediate deportation 
was otherwise required by the immigration laws and necessitated by 
jail overcrowding. 1~2 The defendant responded that by deporting eye-
witnesses, the government had deprived him of access to evidence 
with which to build a defense: ... , · 
The Court recognized that deportation deprived the defen~ant of 
the most direct means of showing that he had actually been denied 
relevant evidence, thus supporting "a rel;rx:ation of the specificity re-
quired in showing materiality," but the Court refused to relieve the 
defendant entirely of this burden.11• Observing that the deportation 
was mandated by statute, the Court averred that "[n]o onus, in the 
sense of 'hidirig out' or 'concealing' witnesses," attached to the gov-
ernment's actions'~" and held that due process required a balancing of 
interests to determine whether governmentai interference with a de-
fendant's right to access to material witnesses violated the principle 
that "a criminal defendant ... be treated with 'that fundamental fair-
ness essential to the very concept of justice."'14~ To make out a due 
process violation, the defendant was required to provide "some plau-
sible explanation of the assistance he would have received from the 
l:o'J 458 u.s. 858,861 (1982). 
1.0 !d. 
HI /d. at 872. 
142 
/d. at 865. 
14
' /d. at 861. 
I +I !d. at 870. 
145 
/d. at 866. 
146 
/d. at 872 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941 )). 
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testimony of the deported witnesses"147-a showing that Valenzuela-
Bernal failed to make. 1• 8 
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,149 the defendant in a sexual abuse of a 
minor prosecution sought disclosure of records maintained by the 
state's Children and Youth Services agency (CYS) regarding the com-
plainant, arguing that the file might contain exculpatory information 
regarding witnesses to the incident and other potentially favorable 
evidence. 1!'oll CYS asserted that the materials were confidential under a 
state statute and withheld the file from both the prosecution and the 
defense:r•t The Court,observed: 
It is well settled that the government' has the obligation to turn over evi-
dence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material 
to guilt or puni~hment .... At thi11 stage, of course, it is impossible to say 
whethc•· any information in the CYS records may be relevant .... 1 ~2 
The Court ruled, therefore, that due process required in camera re-
view of the file by the trial court to determine "whether it contain[ed] 
information that probably would have changed the outcome of [the] 
trial."'r.~ Thus, even without a particularized showing that evidence 
would be favorable, ·and in the face of state-created privileges, due 
process required production of the evidence to determine its import 
for the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 154 
Arizona v. Youngblood'!>' involved untested evidence that had been 
destroyed by prosecutorial negligence. In a prosecution for child mo-
lestation, the police had seized the complainant's clothes and had 
1 ~ 7 Jd.. at 871. 
148 
ld. at 872. 
''*' 480 u.s. 39 (1987}. 
l!'tll 
ld. at 43-45. 
1 ~ 1 lrl. at 43. 
~~~ /d. at 57 (citations omitted). 
1 ~3 !d. at 5B-59. 
1~ The Court ha'> overridden other privilege~ when a deFendant has (lemonstrated 
that" fair trial requires disclosure <>f the witness or evidence protected by the privilege. 
S11f!, P..g., United State.• v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713-16 (1974) {ordering production of 
presidential document.'> over claim of executive privilege); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 
308,315-20 (1974) {deciding juvenile records of prosecution's main witness must be 
disclosed to detense to show bias Ol' molive); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 63-
66 ( 1957) (finding informant's ptivilege trumped by due process right to evidence 
from eyewitnesses to <~lleged criminal event); r.f. Chambers v. MiliSissippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
302-0l~ (1973) {overriding a state rule that prevented the impeachment of a party's 
own witness). 
IM 488U.S.51 (1988). 
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possession of a rape kit with semen samples.' 56 They properly pre-
served the rape kit, but failed to refrigerate the clothing. 157 The sam-
ples from the rape kit were initially analyzed only to determine 
whether sexual contact had occurred, but no testing for blood group-
. d th . l!i8 mg was one at at ume. 
Just before trial, the State's expert examined the clothes for the 
first time and found semen staiits.159 However, due to the lack of re-
frigeration, the evidence was degraded and the expert was unable to 
obtain blood groupings or other identifying characteristics. 11w1 The 
swabs from the rape kit also tested negative for blood groupings.1111 
The state court of appeals determined that proper preservation of the 
evidence would have produced results that "might have completely 
exonemted the defendant" 162 and reversed the conviction. 111~ The Su-
preme Court first found that the State had complied with Brady by 
providing to the defense all expert reports and evaluations of the 
physical evidence as well as access to the evidence for testing by de-
fense experts. 1M For our purposes, the Court's observation that "ac-
cess to the swab and to the clothing" was part of the State's compli-
ance with Brady'r"' is important, since it is access to material in the 
current possession of the State that is at issue in the postconviction 
DNA context. 
The Court viewed Youngblood's claim to preservation of evidence 
as implicating a "constitutional duty over and apart from that imposed 
by ... Brady."166 Emphasizing that "'[w]henever potentially exculpa-
tory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of 
divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, 
very often, disputed, '"167 as well as the vast scope of the possible duty to 
100 
/d. at 53. 
1~7 ld. 
1!11! /d. 
1 ~"1 /d. at 54. 
II;Q /d. 
!HI fd. 
l<if State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 597 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
ltl~ /d. 
11
,.. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 55; see also id. at 58 ("None of this information was con-
cealed from respondent at trial, and the evidence-such as it was--was made a\oailable 
to re~ondent's expert .... "). 
'" hl. at 55. 
11~1 !d. at 56. 
167 
ld. at 57-58 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,487 (1984)). The 
Court in Trombeua ruled that the Due Process Clause did not require the State to pre-
serve breath samples in order to introduce breath-analysis results at trial. 467 U.S. at 
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preserve all potentially significant material, the Court constrained the 
scope of the State's obligation. While Brady did not tum on the "good 
or bad faith of the State,"1118 the Court denied relief to Youngblood by 
requiring a showing of bad faith by the State in failing to preserve evi-
dence.11;o Due process is violated only when "the police themselves by 
their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exon-
erating the defendant."170 
Youngblood and Ritchie leave little doubt concerning the State's ob-
ligation at the trial stage to provide untested DNA evidence that is po-
tentially exculpatory to the defendant. From a constitutional perspec-
tive, there is no functional difference between denying access to 
evidence in the prosecutor's possession and bad faith destruction of 
that evidence; in both cases, evidence which "could form a basis for 
exonerating the defendant" has been deliberately denied to the de-
fendant. This, indeed, was the presupposition of Youngblood itself.171 
491. These samples were obtained and tested to determine the blood alcohol level of a 
DUI suspect. lrl. at 482. The State's duty to preserve evidence was "limited to evidence 
that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense." /d. at 488. 
With respect to breath sample testing, the "intoxily-ler" used by the State to measure 
blood alcohol content was reviewed and certified for accuracy by the state department 
of health, and any faulty operational factors could be raised at trial without regard to 
testing of other samples. hl. at 489-90. Accordingly, the defendant failed to show ei-
ther that the material possessed an exculpatory value or that he did not have alterna-
tive means of demonstrating unreliable results. ld. at 489. By contrast, in a case ·ad· 
dressing postconviction DNA access,. the prosecutor has nfustd to test or disclose 
evidence in her possession. Trombetta is entirely consistent with the application of 
Brad~J>rindples to po5tconviction DNA access. 
YmmgiJiood, 488 U.S. al 57. 
tOO frl. <It 58. 
rro /d. The Coun observed with unintentional irony: "In the present case, the 
likelihood that the preserved materials would have enabled the defendant to exoner-
ate himself appears to be greater than it was in Trombetta • ..• " I d. at 56. The subse· 
quent developments in Mr. Youngblood's case were narrated by justice Feldman of the 
Arizona Supreme Court: 
Youngblood was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and his conviction 
was ultimately upheld by this court on a 3-to-2 vote. Years later, advances in 
science pennitted testing of what evidence remained. Those tests revealed 
that Youngblood, who served some seven years in prison, was not the perpe· 
trator. The convict.ions were vacated in 2000. Su Thomas Stauffer &: Jim 
Erickson, DNA Test Clears Tucsonan ConvicUd in MolesttUion, [ARlz.] DAlLY STAR, 
Aug. 9, 2000, at AI (county attorney usorry" that Youngblood was "incarcer-
ated fol' an offense for which he was not guilty"). 
State v. Harrod, 26 P.3d 492, 505..06 (Ariz. 2001) (Feldman, J., concurring) (footnote 
omitted). 
171 
As the Court stated: 
There is no question but that the State complied with Brady and [United Stales 
v. Agur.Y, 427 U.S. 97 ( 1976)) here. The State disclosed relevant police reports 
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. Likewise, Ritchie makes clear that the proper response to arguments 
about the indeterminate evidentiary value of evidence that the gov-
ernment withholds is to ascertain the real value of the evidence, with-
out any reference to good faith or bad faith. Any potentially determi-
native DNA evidence seized and held by the police or prosecutor must 
be made available for testing and use at trial.m Suggestions that DNA 
need not be tested because "[i] t is not now known whether the bio-
logical evidence being sought by [the defendant] would be favorable 
or unfavorable to him" and could have been denied at trial175 misread 
Supreme Court precedent and exalt willful ignorance. 
Moreover, given the extraordinary exculpatory qualities of DNA 
evidence, police and prosecutors must adjust their procedures to 
avoid destruction of this evidence .. As the Cou~t explained in Young-
blood, the "presence or absence of bad faith ... must necessarily tum 
on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at 
the time it was lost or destroyed."17~ In an era of universal use of DNA 
evidence to both implicate and exonerate criminal suspects, it would 
be disingenuous for the prosecutor to claim that anything short of a 
truly accidentall~ss was not strong evidence of bad faith. 
C. Postconviction Access 
The strongest conceptual argument against applying disclosure 
obligations to postconviction access rests on a construction of Brady 
that limits its protections to the fact-finding process. In the typical 
case seeking postconviction access, the trial has already occurred, and 
du'e process requirements were observed at the time of the trial. 
Thus, the argument goes, the State cannot be accused of unfairly ex-
--------------·-·--~------------------
to [the defendant], which contained information about the existence of the 
swab and the clothing, and the boy's examination at the hospital. The State 
provided ... the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the police crimi-
nologist, and respondent's expert had access to the swab and to the clothing. 
Younflood. 488 U.S. at 55. , 
· 
1 
Sa Brewster v. Shasta County, No. 00-17105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27544, at 
*10-12 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 2001) (finding pretrial denial of access to DNA samples 
would have been a constitutional violation). In BreriJslt!r, the allegation that the failure 
to obtain tesu of potentially exculpatory samples was in bad faith was supported by the 
allegation that the sheriff's department failed to infonn the laboratory of available evi-
dence, or to return the laboratory's calls. /d. at *12; if. Young v. State, 746 N.E.2d 920, 
923 (Ind. 2001) ("We think it is obvious that it would be an abuse of discretion to den)' 
an impecunious defendant funding for a potentially exculpatory DNA test."). 
17 
Harveyv. Horan, 278 F.3d 370,385 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002) (King,J., concurring). 
174 
488 U.S. at 57 n.•. 
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plaiting an informational advantage to obtain a conviction. A number 
of courts have suggested that these differences are sufficient to free 
the State from any postconviction constitutional obligations regarding 
DNA evidence. m. 
The disclosure right that lies at the core of the Brady doctrine, 
however, implicates far more than a formally fair trial. First, the basis 
of the Brady obligation, like much of the .. extratextual" criminal pro-
cedure adopted by the Supreme Court, is not the perfection of the 
rules of a sporting contest, but.the achievement of justice. Brady im-
posed an obligation of disclosure because of a risk that, in the absence 
of disclosure obligations, innocent defendants would be punished. 
This risk persists in the postconviction setting. Brady is based on the 
constitutionalizatio11 of a particu,ar role for the prosecution: it can-
.not be concerned only with convictions, and must take as its motto, 
"The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens 
in the courts." 11r. That proposition applies to postconviction proceed-
ings, and an obsession with finality to the exclusion of justice is at 
odds with the legitimate administration of punishment 
Second, a State's decision to deny access to DNA eviqence. that 
could demonstrate innocence must be judged against the substantive 
due process standards of fundamental fairness and prohibitions on 
arbitrary governmental conduct In cases like Godschalk and Smith, 
denial of access to evide.nce serves no legitimate purpose sufficient to 
save it from constitutional arbitrariness. 
I. Constitutional Importance of Inno<;ence in Criminal Justice 
The protection of innocence has been the touchstone of due pro-
cess in the criminal justice system. The central and common ground 
for declaring certain rights fundamental under the Due Process 
Clause is the protection those rights provide against conviction of in-
175 
E.g., Haroiry, 278 F.3d at 378-79 (rejecting prisoner's Brady claim since he "re· 
ceived a fair trial and was given the opportunity to test the DNA evidence ... using the 
best technology available at the time"). 
17
q Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (reciting the inscription on the wallll 
of the U.S. Department of Justice); if. State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793, 806 (Conn. 
1992) (noting that, if the prosecution umade a tactical choice not to have the ramples 
tested prior to the verdict," then "[s]uch a tactical choice would plainly have been a 
breach of the prosecutor's ethical duty to pursue relevant evidence even if it may be 
exculpatory"); ABA, STANI>ARDS FOR CRIMINAL .JUSTICE PROSECUTION F'UNC110N AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-S.ll (c) (3d ed. 1993) ("A prosecutor should not intentionally 
avoid pursuit of evidence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's 
case or aid the accused."). 
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nocent persons.177 As the Court has declared in the last half century, 
due process prohibits state and federal governments from criminally 
punishing an individual without proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 118 Despite the absence of an explici.t textual warrant for this 
proposition in the Bill of Rights, the Court observed that "the re~on­
able-doubt standard plays a vital role i~ the ~erican scheme of 
criminal procedure."''l'il The Court continued: 
[The) use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to com-
mand the respect and confidence ~f the coml)lunity in applications of 
the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not 
be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether 
. b . d d 180 . • mnocent men are emg con emne . 
Nor is the issue merely one of the proper instructions for a finder of 
fact, since constitutional due process requires that the evidence sub-
mitted actually support the guilt of the individuaJ, to be punished. For 
instance: 
The Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial ritual. A doctrine 
establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional standard must 
.als!J require that the factfinder will rationally apply that stand~rd to the 
facts in evidence. A "reasonable doubt," at a minimum, is one based 
upon "reason... vet a: properly instructed jury may occasionally co~vict 
even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could' find guilt be-
y~nd a reasonable doubt, and the same may be said of a: trial judge sit-
ting as a jury. . . . Under Winship, which established proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt as an essential of J<ourteenth Amendment due process, it 
follows that when such a conviction occurs in a state trial, it cannot con-
. . II d 1st . sutuuona y stan . 
, '" Many of the Supreme Court's cnmmai due process cases arc bait:d on the his-
torically recognized right to a reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e.g., 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110-14 (1977) (requiring the totality of the circum-
stances approach to the identification of witnesses); In n:Winship, 397 U.S. 358,362-64 
(1970) (concerning the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 22~38 (1967), (requiring prosecutors to use fair identification 
procedures); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338-41} (1963) (establishing the de-
fendant's right to appointed counsel); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 106 (1935) 
(establishing the prohibition against use of perjured testimony). 
1711 
See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64 (discussing the necessity of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in criminal cases). 
179 !d. at 363. 
180 
!d. at 364; see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977) (MLong before 
Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
181 
Jackson"· Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 ( 1979) (footnotes omitted). 
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This principle is not merely an artifact of the Warren Court, nor is 
it extinguished by the fact of a final criminal conviction affirmed by 
state courts. Just last Term, in Fiare v. 'White, the Court unanimously 
granted relief to a habeas petitioner who proved that no trial evidence 
supported an element of the crime of which he was convicted, despite 
the affirmance of his conviction by state appellate courts.'82 It reaf-
firmed that when proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not support 
each element of a crime, as a matter of due process, the continued in-
carceration of the individual is unlawful.183 
To be sure, the standards demanded by due process apply differ-
ently once a defendant has been convicted. T~e Court has not re-
solved the question of whether a post-trial demonstration of factual 
innocence beyond the trial record can be the basis for a habeas peti-
tion, but it has held that such a claim of actual innocence cannot im-
peach a criminal verdict in the absence of a "truly persuasive" demon-
stration of factual error. 181 It is precisely such a demonstration that 
the denial of DNA evidence makes impossible. 
The right to disclosure of favorable evidence emanates from cor-
relative due process protections: by making available exculpatory evi-
11111 531 u.s. 225,228-29 (2001). 
'"' /d.; Slit! also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (noting that "concern 
about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long 
been at the core of our criminal justice system" and crafting an exception to the pro-
cedural default rules to allow a habeas petition with an appropriate showing of actual 
innocence when a petitioner is "alleging a fundamental miscarriage of justice" rather 
than "alleging that his sentence is too severe"). 
tllol Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Herrera did not resolve the ques-
tion of whether a post-trial demonstration of actual innocence renders criminal pun-
ishment unconstitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion assumed "for the 
sake of argument" that a "truly persuasive" showing would have that effect; however. it 
concluded that no such showing had been made. /d. In this proposition, he was 
joined by separate concurring opinions by justice O'Connor, writing for herself and 
Justice Kennedy, id. at 419-27 (O'Connor,j., concuning), and by Justice White, id. at 
429 (White,j., concurring). The dissent by justice Blackmun,joined by Justices Stev-
ens and Souter, would have held that a "truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual in-
nocence"' would make execution of the petitioner unconstitutional, and remanded for 
investigation of petitioner's claim un t11at standard. /d. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissent· 
ing). Only Justices S~;alia and Thomas would have found no due process concerns pre-
sented by newly discovered evidence of innocence. /d. at 428-29 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). · 
Fiurt!,likewise, did not resolve the question, since it was a clarification of the state's 
interpretation of its law, rather than a supervening demonstration of fact, that led the 
Court to overrule the Third Circuit. 531 U.S. at 228-29; see also St:lilup, 513 U.S. at 315-
16 (distinguishing the claim in Schlup from the claim in Herrera based primarily on the 
fact that Schlup asserted a constitutional error at trial and was thus permitted to make 
a lesser showing of innocence). 
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dence, disclosure setves to ensure that the innocent are not wrong-
fully punished.185 Brady and its progeny are premised on the principle 
that suppression of material evidence poses a significant risk of pun-
ishing the innocent, and, when post-uial access to DNA evidence can 
establish that this risk has become manifest, Brady's fundamental 
principles are implicated. 
As the Brady doctrine has evolved, the Court has imposed duties 
previously thought to be incompatible with the adversarial system. 
Prior to Brady not only was there no tradition or history of mandated 
disclosure of favorable evidence, but discovery in criminal cases was 
severely resuicted in mostjurisdictions. 1111., The Court has relied upon 
general principles of fairness, and rudimentary demands of justice, 
and the specific goal of avoiding conviction and incarceration of the 
innocent as the grounds for the disclosure mandate. As the Court 
stated: "A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an ac-
cused which ... would tend to exculpate him ... does not comport 
with standards ofjustice .... "187 
Like the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Brady rule is not based upon any specific textual requirement of the 
Constitution. Rather, it is grounded in the .broad concerns of funda-
mental fairness. In the pre-Brady period, the Court ruled that due 
process prohibited the use of petjured testimony by the government; 
such conduct was said to be "inconsistent with the ntdimentary de-
mands of justice," and, hence, proscribed by a conception of due pro-
cess that "embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie 
at the base of our civil and political institutions. "11111 So too, the Court 
determined that a failure to correct inaccurate statements by a prose-
cution witness violated due process, observing that "[t]he principle 
that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false tes-
timony, to obtain a tainted conviction, [is) implicit in any concept of 
ordered liberty." 1811 The disclosure obligation germinated in a period 
defined by evolving standards of liberty and justice; the prosecutor's 
1115 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[The] purpose [of Brady] is 
not to displace the advel'l!ary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, 
but to ensure that a miscarriage ofjustice does not occur."). 
tllll See supra text accompanying no~ 112 {describing the hyper-adverJarial state of 
criminal law that existed before Brody); su also Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317-18 
(4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., concurring) (rejecting the history of concealment in favor 
offull disclosure of evidence that might prove innocence). 
187 
Brady v. Maryland, .!173 U.S. 83,87-88 (1963). 
188 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). 
189 
Napue v.lllinpis, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959). 
.. 
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obligations· were tied directly to the protection against conviction and 
incarceration of the innocent. 
Brady itself was decided in the .. incorporation era" during which 
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the 
states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.190 
But Brady drew on an earlier, and less textually focused, methodology, 
for none of the more· specific provisions of the Bill of Rights are di-
rectly implicated by the issue of disclosure of exculpatory material. 
Brady's due process analysis rested upon concerns of the reliability of 
the fact-finding process and the legitimate role of the governme~t in 
exercising its police power. As the Court explored the obligations 
that flowed from Brady and faced issues relating to the loss or destruc-
tion of potentially .e~culpatory evidence, "free-standing due process" 
principles designed to assure the accurat~ imposition of criminal pun-
ishment continued to dominate its analysis. 1111 Professor Israel has 
commented that "free-standing due process rulings might be charac-
terized as 'narrow' in. that they tend to focus on the value of adjudica-
tory fairness (looking primarily to protect against the conviction of the 
innocent), rather than on the broader range ofvalues reflected in the 
whole of the specific guarantees. nl!l'l 
The analysis that generated Brady-and the fundamental role of 
innocence in the criminal justice system-extends to postconviction 
proceedings. When the government possesses previously secured 
DNA evidence that could demonstrate innocence, the principles of 
fundamental fairness that coalesced to produce the Brady doctrine 
maintain their force. just as the .constitutional status of the "re~on­
able doubt". requirement forbids the continued incarceration of a 
convicted defendant when it becomes clear after trial that the evi-
dence against her fails to sustain the elements of a crime, 19~ the State . . ' 
100 
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury); Malloy. v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) 
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees defendants the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment's privilege .against self-incrimination in state courts); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's guar· 
antee of the right to counsel). 
1 ~1 See Jerold H. lsra~l, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedun: Tilt. SufJrrnl#. 
Court:S Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 303, 383 (2001) (discussing 
the development offundamental fairness in the post-incorporation era). 
192 
Jd. at 397-98 (footnote omitted). · 
"
13 
See Fiore v. White, 531 ·u.s. 225, 228-29 (2001) ·(holding that the defendant 
could not continue to be incarcerated when the prosecution failed to prove an ele-
ment of the crime). 
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should not be free to deny post-trial access to evidence that can defini-
tively negate guilt. ; : 
To be sure, as Justice White observed in Patterson v. New York: 
Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at 
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent per-
son. Punishment of those found guilty by a jury, for example, is not for-
bidden merely ·because there is a remote possibility in some instances 
that an innocent person might go to jail.
191 
• • • .. 
It is only the failure to provide the constitutional 'minima necessary to 
assure "fundamental fairness" that offends the Constitution. 
The proper mode of analysis for "fundamental fairness" in crimi-
nal due process has be~n a matter of some disagreement on the 
Court. 19~ Given the fact' that Brady "require[s] States to institute pro-
cedures· that were neither required at common law rior explicitly 
command-ed by the text of the Constitution,"196 it would seem that a 
narrow. historical analysis is simply inapposite 'to determining the 
scope of the Brady obligations. Indeed, in examining the reach of 
l9'1 4.32 u.s. 197,208 (1977). ' ' 
195 
For example, in Medina v. Califomia, 505 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1992),Justice Ken· 
nedy's majority opinio'n rejected the balancing test of MatheWs v. Eldri~. 424 U.S. 319, 
334-35 (1976), as a template for determining "fundamental fairness" for purposes of 
criminal procedure. Instead, it adopted an analysis that looked first to historical prac-
tice and then to "'fundamental fairness' in operation." MedinfJ. 505 U.S. at 448 (quot-
ing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) ). J~tices O'Connor and Souter 
concurred in lhe judgment, but argued lhat the wbalancing of equities is inappropriate 
in evaluating whelher state criminal procedures amount to due process." ld. at 453 
(O'Connor,)., concurring). 
In Montana v. Egelhoff, Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, took lhe position 
that wroJur primary guide in determining whether the prinCiple in question is funda~ 
mental is ... historical practice." 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). By contrast, Justice 
O'Connor, writing for four Justices in dissent, maintained that proper analysis '"re-
quires that the competing intere.s.ts be closely examined."' ld. at 67 (O'Connor,]., dis-
senting) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). Justice Souter 
focused on whelher'thechallenged practice was wrational.in today's world." Id. at 74-
75 (Souter,]., dis~enting): 
In Cooper v. Oklahoma, a unanimous Court looked to bolh historical practice and 
"whether the rule exhibit[ed] 'fundamental fairness' in operation" in invalidating a 
procedural system lhat ~impose{d) a significant risk of an erroneous determination" 
when ~injury to lhe State ... [was] modest." 517 U.S. 348,362-65 (1996). 
Judge Luttig has suggested that lhe balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge 
provides wthe proper analytical framework for determining whether there exists a pro-
cedural due process right to (DNA] a~cess," because the asserted right does not chal-
lenge a conviction. Harvey v, Horan, 285 F.Sd 298, 315 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,j., 
concurring). 
196 
Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O'Conrior,J., concurring). 
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Brady in United States v. Ruiz.,m Justice Breyer, writing for eight justices, 
made no mention of history. Instead, he engaged in a balancing of 
interests, including the importance of avoiding the conviction and in-
carceration of innocent individuals, the value of the proposed addi-
tional safeguards, and the adverse impact of the proposed obligations 
on governmental interests. 198 Determining whether "fundamental 
fairness" demands access to DNA evidence thus requires an evaluation 
of both the degree of protection access provides against punishment 
of the innocent and the burden such protection casts on the State. 
Where the State gains exclusive access to evidence that can dem-
onstrate innocence, the concerns of "fundamental fairness" militate 
strongly in favor of releasing that evidence. 1119 The marriage of new 
and uniquely powerful exonerating forensic science to the historic 
fundamental due process guarantees against conviction of the inno-
cent commands disclosure at any point in the continuum of the 
criminal process. There can be no exaggerating the unique and un-
precedented power of DNA forensic science to determine guilt or in-
nocence in serious criminal cases. Eyewitness testimony, confessions 
or other admissions of guilt, and other forms of direct and circum-
stantial evidence of guilt or innocence present issues of credibility that 
turn largely on subjective evaluations as to perception, memory, ar-
ticulation, bias, motive, and self-interest. Forensics have provided 
strong evidence in certain areas (e.g., blood alcohol tests for DUI and 
radar for speeding cases), but this evidence ·often concerns compara-
tively minor charges, and even with this evidence, there is rarc:!ly proof 
of guilt or innocence beyond all doubt.200 The analysis we have set 
forth would apply as well 'to equally compelling and determinative 
t\71 122 S. Ct. 2450 (2002). 
198 
ltl. at 245&-57. In setting forth the standard of analysis in Ruiz., the Court relied 
on Akev. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Rui1., 122 S. Ct. at 2456. In Ake, the Court ap-
plied a Mathews analysis to a question of criminal procedure. 470 U.S. at 77. 
199 
The Court has applied due process or equality principles to avoid fundamental 
unfairnel!s in a variety or contexts. See, ~.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56-62 (1987) 
·(concluding that per se exclusion of defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony vio-
lated defendant's right to testify on her own behalf); Webb v. TeKas, 409 U.S. 95, 97-98 
(1972) (holding that the defendant was denied due process when a defense witness 
decided not to testify following the trial judge's threat of a perjury prosecution); Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a state statute that 
rendered accomplices incompetent to testify for one another, though competent to 
testi~for the State). . 
Cf. United States ex ul. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 (3d Cir. 1952} 
(holding that it violated the defendant's due process rights for the prosecution to sup-
press physical evidence that could have determinatively exonerated him). 
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evidence, whether currently existing or of a new technology not yet 
developed. However, it is important to note the limitation we would 
impose: the evidence would have to be comparable to DNA in its ex-
culpatory power. 
Recent disclosures in cases in which DNA evidence has exoner-
ated persons on death row or serving long prison sentences demon-
strate that the evolving technology can hold the key to justice for the 
convicted innocent. 201 In scores of cases where convictions appeared 
to be based on solid, and in some circumstances overwhelming, evi· 
dence, DNA evidence has proven actual innocence. By the same to-
ken, DNA evidence now serves as a critical and essential filter in the 
investigative phase of criminal proceedings. Thus, it is difficult to 
imagine a case today that would result in charges being pressed when 
DNA evidence excludes the suspect (even in the face of otherwise 
compelling evidence of guilt); conversely, where DNA demonstrates 
that the suspect was the perpetrator, even with no other evidence, the 
prospects for conviction are virtually ensured.202 No other evidence 
known to the criminal justice system has this broadly applicable and 
uniquely dispositive power.20~ Providing access to such evidence im-
:mt See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 20, at 246 (describing the types of 
cases where innocent people were wrongly convicted and later exonerated). Since 
DNA evidence has been routinely used in the investigative process of criminal cases, it 
has resulted in the clearance of prime suspects in twenty-five percent of cases. Peter 
Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, Foreword to CONNORS ET AL., supra note 27, at xxviii, x.xviii; 
St!8 also DeueiDpmmls in the Law-O:mfrunting the New ChoJien~s of Scientific Evidence, supra 
note 133, at 1577-78 (noting that even if a defendant has been found innocent 
through DNA evidence, she may still face difficulties achieving her freedom); cJ. supra 
note 47 (recounting the use of DNA evidence to identify World Trade C-enter victims). 
llll'l See Marjory Fisher, Procedural issues Surrounding Post-Conviction DNA Ttsling. 35 
NEW ENG. L REv. 621, 622 {2001) (explaining that prosecutors use DNA to inculpate 
and exonerate defendants). Indeed, DNA evidence is so reliable that some states per-
mit "John Doe" indictments when DNA evidence exists but no suspect has been identi-
fied. See Meredith A. Bieber, Comment, Meeting the Statute or Beating It: Using john 
Doe" lndktmtm/.s Based on DNA to Meet the Statute of Limitations, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1079, 
1083 (2002) (noting DNA-based indictments without a suspect in New York, Wiscon· 
sin, and New Mexico). . 
~~ In some jurisdictions, the right to access DNA ·postconviction is based on an 
analysis of the "strength" of the State's case at trial. Thus, in some cases, it is only when 
the State relied on disputed eyewitness testimony as opposed to a confession of the de· 
fendant that DNA testing has been ordered. See Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 
A.2d 1295, 1297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that DNA evidence was not required 
because the defendant's conviction was based primarily on his "confession"); Com-
monwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that principles 
of justice required the case to be remanded for DNA testing, given that the State's only 
evidence was an eyewitness account). But given the dispositive "strength" of DNA evi· 
dence, this approach is seriously flawed. Indeed, twenty-four percent of DNA exonera· 
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poses no burden on legitimate state interests. Where DNA demon-
strates innocence, a central reason for respecting finality of criminal 
judgments-that retrying a case years later will yield no objectively 
sounder result than the initial trial-is not implicated. Where new 
evidence is secured, whether it be direct evidence of innocence or 
impeachment of the State's case at trial, there is usua11y no certainty of 
its exculpatory value. Witnesses may change stories for truthful or in-
vidious reasons, and attacks mounted years after trial on the integrity 
of witnesses or other evidence may raise doubts but not prove inno-
cence. DNA, by contrast, can demonstrate innocence; as we discuss 
below, it does so without trespassing on any other interest that sup-
ports finality ofjudgments.204 
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny rest on the premise that the 
prosecutor as a representative of the government is obligated to see 
that justice is done. As the Court stated: 
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal 
trials are fair; our system ofthe administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Depart-
ment of justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: 
~The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in 
the courts." A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an ac-
cused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce 
the penalty ... does not comport with standards of justice .... 
200 
The obligations that the Court imposed ensure that the prosecutor is 
"the 'servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer. ,,wn While these commitments were enun-
tions involve "confessions." S# DWYER. NEUFELD &: SCHECK, sufrra note 20, at 246 
(breaking down the reasons for the wrongful convictions of those exonerated through 
DNA testing). Once DNA excludes a defendant, no matter how strong the case ap-
peared at trial, we know to a moral certainty that the defendant is innocenL 
2fM See infra Part IV (arguing that DNA disclosure neither practically nor theoreti· 
cally interferes with the State's interest in finality). 
105 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87-88 (1963); su also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 
66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("A criminal trial is not a game in which the 
s.tat.e's function is to outwit and entrap its quarry. The State's pursuit is justice, not a 
>1Ctlm. ). 
~~~~ United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1985) ); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 268, 281 (1999) (ex-
plaining that the special role of the prosecutor, as '"the representative ... of a sover-
eignty ... whose interest .•. [is] that justice shall be done;w is the reason behind re-
quiring prosecutorial disclosure (quoting Bergtr. 295 U.S. at 88)); United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) ("By requiring the prosecutor to assist the defense 
in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a pure adversary 
model.~); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 ( 1995) (concluding that disclosure 
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dated in the context of trial proceedings, there is no reason to believe 
that they evaporate upon conclusion of trial. It would be inconsistent 
with the constitutionally mandated role of the prosecutor to offer fab-
ricated evidence on appeal or in postconviction proceedings. It is no 
less an abdication of the obligation to ensure "that justice shall be 
done" for a prosecutor to seek to maintain the effect of a verdict she 
has won by denying access to evidence that could show such a verdict 
to be urtjust.207 And, as we will see, it is primarily a claimed interest in 
"finality" that· undergirds the opposition to postconviction DNA test-
ing. 
2. Constitutional Arbitrariness and Due Process 
General due process principles provide a second basis for prevent-
ing prosecutors from denying post-trial access to potentially exculpa-
tory DNA By refusing access to DNA samples in cases like Godschalk 
and Smith. prosecutors make it impossible for prisoners to prove their 
innocence in any venue. The government thereby imposes a postcon-
viction risk that innocent prisorters will conpnue to suffer confine-
ment. Several courts have recognized that this imposition of risk vio-
lates the minimal demands of the Due Process Clause.208 
on the part of the prosecutor serves "to justify trust in the prosecutor as 'the represen-
tative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a crimir!'al prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done'" (quoting' Berger, 295 U.S. at 88)). 
w
7 
See State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 252 (NJ. Super. CLApp. Div. 1991) ("[W]e 
can conceive of no greater injustice, when that evidence is available, of depriving a 
convicted defendant ofaccess to it. The prosecutor, the court, and the judicial system 
have an obligation to protect the innocent which is no less fundamental than the obli-
gation ... to punish the guilty."); Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ind. CL App. 
1992) (concluding that Brady can require disclosure of evidence that v.-as not available 
at the time of the defendant's trial for DNA comparison, stating that there would be 
"'no greater injustice'" than depriving a convicted defendant of access to available evi-
dence (quoting Th0711QS, 586 A.2d at 252) ). The court in State v. Hammond admonished 
the prosecution for possibly not testing DNA material prior to the verdict. 604 A.2d 
793,806 (Conn. 1992). According to the court: 
Such a tactical choice would plainly have been a breach of the prosecutor's 
ethical duty to pursue relevant evidence even if it may be exculpatory. "It is 
unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor intentionally to avoid pursuit of evi· 
dence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid 
the accused.~ 
!d. (~oting] ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRJMINALjUSTICE § 3-3.11 (c) (2d ed. 1980) ). 
See, e.g., Lambert v. State,l999-CA.00395-SCT,1 21 (Miss. 2001), 777 So. 2d 45, 
49 ("[W]e cannot say with definite and finn conviction that a mistake has not been 
made. The least we can do now is allow [the defendant] to apply modem science to 
the evidence used against him."); State v. Velez, 746 A.2d 1073, 1078 (NJ. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2000) ("We recognize the importance of finality. However, the objective of 
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The Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on the disconcert-
ing question of whether a State violates the minimal demands of due 
process when it continues to punish a convicted prisoner who can 
conclusively demonstrate factual innocence. In Herrera v. Collins, a 
death row inmate sought to present newly discovered evidence in fed-
eral postconviction proceedings that he claimed exonerated him of 
the murders for which he faced execution.200 Writing for three Jus-
tices in dissent who would have entertained the claim, Justice Black-
mun viewed the question as whether it was contrary to "contemporary 
standards of decency" to "execute a person who is actually inno-
cent."21(1 The dissenters would have ruled that under the Eighth 
Amendment the "legitimacy of punishment is inextricably intertwined 
with guilt"211 and that the execution of an innocent person is an "arbi-
trary imposition" that would violate the demands of substantive due 
21% process. 
The balance of the Court rejected this characterization. The ma-
jority acknowledged the importance of factual guilt for criminal pun-
ishment.m But according to the m~ority, "petitioner [did] not come 
the criminal justice system is the fair conviction of the guilty and the protection of the 
innocent. The system fails if an innocent person is convicted."); Thomas, 586 A.2d at 
254 ("We would rather tear at [the] roots [of the defense bar's trial responsibility] ... 
than sit by while an innocent man ... 'languishes in prison while the true offender 
stalks his next victim."' (quoting id. at 255 (Baime,J., dis.<;enting)));jenner v. Dooley, 
1999 SO 20, t 19,590 N.W.2d 463, 471-72 (stating that ~when newly developed scien-
tific procedures can establish innocence[,] ... elementary fairness may compel the 
new testing" and that prisoners are entitled to testing when such evidence "'would most 
likely produce an acquittal in a new trial" and costs are not "exorbitant"); Julian v. 
State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (rejecting a restrictive interpretation of a state 
postconviction Statute and Stating: uu· a Statute of limitations alone COUld be appJ.ied to 
dismiss such a petition, a person who has spent years in prison who could show his in-
nocence-e.g., by new DNA evidence ... could never be exonerated and obtain free-
dom from wrongful incarceration."). AJso, as the coun noted in Grinol.s v. State: 
[A) defendant who obtained clear genetic evidence of their (sic] innocence 
would be barred from presenting this evidence to the courts if the defendant 
had already sought post-conviction relief on any other ground. In such cir· 
cumstances, we believe that the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of due proc-
ess of law would require the courts to hear the defendant's petition even 
though the Statute seemingly prohibits it. 
10 P.3d 600, 617 (A1ask.'l Ct. App. 2000). 
20!1 506 u.s. 390, 393, 397 ( 1993). 
:tlo tel. at 430 (Biackmun,j., dissenting). 
211 
fd. at 434 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). 
212 
Jd. at 437 (Biackmun,J., dissenting). 
m See id. at 404 (asserting that federal habeas jurisprudence does not cast wa blind 
eye toward innocence"); see also id. at 419 (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("[E]xecut.ion of 
a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event."). 
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before this Court as an innocent man, but rather as one who has been 
convicted by due process of law of two capital murders."214 In this 
view, the issue was the procedural one of whether, at the instance of 
postconviction review, a federal court must entertain the claim that 
could once again convert the petitioner into one who is "innocent in 
the eyes of the law."215 The majority assumed "for the sake of argu-
ment in deciding [the] case, that in a capital :case a truly persuasive 
demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the 
execution of a defendant unconstitutional," and went on to assume 
that this showing would "warrant federal habeas relief if there were no 
h 1 
. . ,216 state avenue open to process sue a c a1m. 
Herrera harbors deep philosophical issues.217 The majority's ap-
proach rests on assumptions about the fallibility of the search for 
Justice Scalia, in a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, took the position that the 
absence of support for postconviction reviews of innocence in constitutional text or 
historical practice meant that there was no constitutional bar to the execution of any 
person claiming actual innocence after conviction. See id. at 427-28 (Scalia,J., concur-
ring) ("There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that 
were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration 
of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction."). 
tl
4 /d. at 407 n.6. 
71~ '/d. at 419 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (characterizing the majority's position). 
tl& /d. at 417. Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and Justice Kennedy in con-
currence, took the position that Mexecution of a legally and factually innocent person 
would be a constitutionally intolerable event," id. at 419, but left open the question of 
the availability of habeas re.lief, since the defendant had not made the ~extraordinarily 
high" and ~truly persuasive" demonstration of innocence that would be the minimum 
necessary to trigger such relief on any theory, id. at 426-27: Similarly, Justice White's 
concurrence "assume[d) that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after 
trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the pres-
entation of newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of 
petitioner in this case." /d. at 429. 
In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-17 (1995), Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, emphasized that Herrera established a mini-
mum evidentiary standard for bare innocence claims, but only accepted their constitu-
tional viability arguendo, leaving the substantive question open. The Court denied 
relief, however, because no Mtruly persuasive" demonstration was forthcoming. /d. at 
312. 
217 
The m;Uority's approach to the question of innocence in Herrera sometimes 
reads as if it subscribes to postmodern concepts of soda1ly constructed reality. In fact, 
the approach mirrors the analysis advanced by Professor Bator in 1963, grounded on 
the positivist epistemology of Karl Popper. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Oriminal Law 
and Federal Habeas Cmpusfor Slate Prisfmm, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441. 44649 (1963) (deny-
ing that the goal of post-trial criminal procedure can be to determine whether facts as 
found are Mreally" true and the Jaw "really" correctly applied); id. at 448 n.12 (relying 
on Karl Popper for the proposition that the suggested approach assumes the existence 
of truth, but asserts fallibility in perceiving it}. Our own presuppositions are resolutely 
pre-postmodem; we write under the assumption that the identity of the perpetrator of 
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truth: an individual may be innocent in some ultimate sense of com-
mitting the act for which she has been charged, yet not "innocent in 
the eyes of the law" because the "truth" that has emerged from her 
trial holds her to be guilty. We as a society must live with that result in 
the absence of epistemologically privileged access to past reality. The 
driving moral force of the Herrera opinion comes from the concern 
that "there is no guarantee that the guilt or innocence determination 
would be any more exact" in a second trial, and as between first and 
second trials, "the passage of time only diminishes the reliability of 
criminal adjudications."~~~ The majority's arguendo exception for 
"truly persuasive" showings of innocence responds to this concern. In 
this regard, the capacity to analyze DNA evidence-a capacity that did 
not exist at the time of the Herrera decision--can be dispositive, for it 
would stretch legal'fiction beyond the breaking point to characterize a 
prisoner as scientifically innocent, but not "innocent in the eyes of the 
law." 
The years since Herrera have also strengthened the legal theories 
of the dissenters. Shortly before Herrera, Justices Scalia and Rehnquist 
contended that the Ei.ghth Amendment contained no proportionality 
principle requiring that punishment be· related to culpable guilt.~ 19 
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter emphasized the "nar-
rowness" of Eighth Amendment proportionality review in upholding a 
life sentence for possession of 650 grams of cocaine.220 In the inter-
vening decade, the Court has been willing to invalidate punishments 
on the basis of independent judicial determinations that the pun-
ishments were 'gr~ssly disproportional to the gravity of ... defen-
dant[s'] offense(s]. "'221 Where it can be scientifically proven that the 
a crime is a "realM fact, and that continuing to punish an individual on the ground that 
she is the perpeU<~Ior when that proposition is scientifically false is "really" unjtL~t. 
These presuppositions undergird much of the jurisprudence of modem criminal pro-
cedure. Our approach is· compatible with Popperian epistemology: we need claim 
only that DNA exonerations are a more reliable guide to truth than a jury verdict or a 
guihitflea. 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403. . . 
219 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975-84 (1991) (Scalia, J .. joined by 
Rehnouist, CJ.). . 
:rl<r 
/d. at996-1001 (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
~I 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. LeaLhennan Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,434 (2001) 
(alterations&: omission in 'original) (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321. 
334 ( 1998)); see alfo Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (2002) (invalidating the 
imposition of capital punishment on a mentally retarded defendant, holding '"that it is 
a precept of justice that puni11hment for crime should be graduated and proportioned 
to the offense' [and) [w)e have repeatedly applied this proportionality precept in later 
cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment.~ (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
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defendant has committed no crime, his continued incarceration can-
not be anything but "disproportional" to his offense.2n 
So, too, the Court has reiterated the importance and viability of 
"substantive due process" limits on arbitrary governmental conduct 
that "shock[s] the conscience of the court."22s While Justice Scalia's 
concurrence in Herrera disdained an appeal to the conscience of the 
courtn•-a position consistent with. his general distrust of substantive 
due process analysis--six members of the Court, in County of Sacra-
mento v. Lewis, reaffirmed the importance of substantively safeguard-
ing against arbitrary uses of governmental power.225 These safeguards 
are directly implicated by arbitrary denial of access to DNA evidence. 
Finally, Judge Luttig has expressed the view that one who has been 
convicted retains "a protected liberty interest in his core right to free-
dom from bodily re~traint . . . [and] a protected liberty interest to 
pursue his freedom from c~nfinement, though obviously after convic-
349,367 (1910))); Hanntlin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy,]., concurring) (discussing the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences); Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (stating that the Eighth Amendment prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime 
committed), overruled IJy Harmel.in, 501 U.S. at 965; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660, 667 (1962) (holding that even though a ninetj-day prison term was neither cruel 
nor unusual in the abstract, the facts in that case rendered the sentence violative of the 
Eighth Amendment). . 
We may learn more on this topic when the Court addresses the question of pro-
portionality (with respect to California's "Three Strikes" law) in its review of Andrade v. 
Attorney Gtmera~ 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), c'ert. granted sub nom. Lockyer·v. Andrade, 
122 S. Ct. 1434 (2002). 
:m For a prisoner who is entirely without guilt, no punishment could be constitu· 
tional. S,.e Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 ('"Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the "crime• of having a common cold."' (quoting Robinson, 
370 U.S. at 667)). 
m United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 
illl4 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428. 
22~ See 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998) (rejecting Justice Scalia's position in Herrera). 
Lewis e~tablished a high burden of proof-intent to barm-in ca.c•es where police are 
acting in situations (a high speed chase in /AUi.f) that give them little time to deliher· 
ate. One of the authors has previously argued that the constellation of opinions in 
Washington v. Glucluberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), indicates a growing consensus within the 
Court that arbitrary interferences with bodily liberty are subject to substantive due pro-
cess review, set! Seth F. Kreimer, The Second Time as Tragedy: The Assisted Suicitbt Cases and 
tl~ Heritage of Roe v. Wade, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 863, 866 (1997) (analyzing the 
status of substantive due process in the Court), and that invalidation of violations of 
minimal moral norms plays a legitimate and increasingly large role in our constitu-
tional jurisprudence, see Seth F. Kreimer, Expluring tlur Dark Matter of judicial Revieru: A 
Constitulionnl Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 510-19 (1997) (dis· 
cussing the essential moral norms that necessarily limit the exercise of governmental 
powers). 
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tion these interests are residual and considerably reduced."2'lf> When 
the State provides-as all states do
227
-a legal entitlemf:nt to postcon-
viction relief upon a specified factual showing, it establishes a positive 
law liberty interest that grounds due process constraints on the grant 
or denial of reliee2A While the due process obligations are not identi-
cal to those that attach at the initial trial, the State may not dispose of 
the prisoner's interests in a constitutionally arbitrary fashion. 
In Herrera, the Court observed that even when postconviction ju-
dicial review is unavailable, "[e]xecutive clemency has provided the 
'fail safe' in our criminal justice system. ,2'.l!l Denial of access to evi-
dence that makes possible this "fail safe" remedy can constitute a dep-
rivation of an important liberty interest. Though the matter is not en-
tirely free from doubt, in its most recent examination of the scope of 
the clemency interest in Ohio Adult Parole Authurity v. Woodard,2llll five 
Justices joined in the proposition that due process constrains the de-
nial of parole. 
When a person has been fairly convicted and sentenced, his liberty in-
terest, in being free from such confinement, has been extinguished. But 
iL is incorrect ... to say that a prisoner has been deprived of all inter-
est .... Thus, although it is tme that "pardon and commutation deci-
sions have not traditionally been the business of com't'>w ... some mini-
mal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings. Judicial 
intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme 
whereby a srate official flipped a coin to detennine whether to grant 
~211 Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 313 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,J., concurring). 
·~''' .. See Lackawctnna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394,. 402 (2001) 
(" [E] ach State ha.~ created mechanisms for both direct appeal and state postconviction 
review .... " (citing LARRVYACKL£, POSTCONVICI'ION REMEDIES§§ 1, 13 (1981 ed. & 
Supp.2000))). 
TlM See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 387-88 (1985) (holding that, even though not 
constitutionally required, when a State provides for appellate review of a Climinal con-
viction, it musl, under federal due process principles, accord all defendants the proc-
ess guaranteed by the Constitution); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (de-
ciding r.haL state laws guaranteeing a defendant procedural rights at sentencing may 
create a liberty interest protected by r.he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenr.h 
Amendment against arbitrary deprivation); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (stating that r.he right to peremptory challenges is a state-created liberty in-
terest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (asserting that the arbitrary denial of parole is a substantive due process vio-
lation). 
22!' 506 U.S. at 415 (quo~ng KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: jUSTICE, MERCY, 
AND THE PUBLIC ll'\'TEREST 131 (1989)). 
2~11 523 u.s. 272 (1998). 
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clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any 
. I 2" access to tts c emency process. 
These precedents converge on the proposition that the State may 
not arbitrarily deny access to DNA evidence that could free an inno-
cent prisoner. At their core, the constitutional protections of life and 
liberty prevent the State from consciously and without justification 
harming innocent individuals.~'' It would, presumably, provoke no 
gr~at disagreement to find that a State that continued to incarcerate a 
convicted defendant after performing a determinatively exculpatory 
DNA test would violate the Constitution.2.'1! But in cases like Godscha/Jr. 
and Smith, s~nce no test had been performed, there is no deliberate 
imprisonment of the innocent, and the question of what actions short 
of such deliberately wrongful deprivations violate due process is less 
clearly determined by precedent. 
As we have discussed, the Supreme Court has recently advised that 
"the touchstone of due process is protection ... against arbitrary ac-
tion of government, " 2~4 "the exercise of power without any reasonable 
justification,"m or "egregious" and "abusive executive action" that 
"shocks the conscience."236 "[N]egligently inflicted harm," by contrast, 
m /d. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer,jJ.) 
(quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)). justice Stev· 
ens adopted a similar position. See id. at 291 (Stevens,j., dissenting in part) (arguing 
that fundamental fairness constrains the exercise of pardon power and stating that "de-
liberate fabrication of false evidenceft in a clemency proceeding would violate due pro-
cess). Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion (with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Kennedy) would have placed clemency proceedings wholly beyond the reach of due 
process constraints. ld. at 279. 
2'~ E.g .. Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2514 (2002) (examining the cruel and 
unusual punishment inflicted on petitioner by handcuffing him to a hitching post); 
County of Sacramentn v. Lewi~. 523 U.S. R33, 854 ( 1998) (discussing the implication~ 
of a high speed police chase on the decedent's Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
m CJ. Kennell v. Gates, 215 F.3d 825, 826 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that continued 
detention after being informed that prisoner's fingerprints did not match those of the 
suspect violated due process); Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Conn. 
1994) ("Even the strong interest in the finality of judgments and the state's interest in 
retrying a defendant with reasonably fresh evidence does not require the continued 
imprisonment of one who is actually innocent."); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 
1330, 1335 (Ill. 1996) (arguing that as a matter of state constitutional law, 
"[i]mprisonment of the innocent would also be so conscience shocking as to trigger 
operation of substantive due processM). 
2'~ Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845. 
m !d. at846. 
236 
ld.; see id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("(H]istory and tradition are the 
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process in-
quiry."); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) ("The Doctrine of Due Proc-
ess ... was '"intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the pow-
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"is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due proc-
ess. ,:m In Lewis, the Court defined constitutional arbitrariness as an 
"exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service 
of a legitimate governmental objective. ''238 
The· denial ·of access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence in 
the government's custody is not an act of negligence; Godschalk and 
Smith were faced with a deliberate and unilateral prosecutorial deci-
sion that assured their continued incarceration. Under Supreme 
Court precedent, therefore, the question of whether that decision 
rises (or sinks) to the level of arbitrariness that "shocks the conscience 
of the court" turns on the degree to which the State can claim "rea~ 
sonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objec-
tive."m 
The Court has had relatively few opportunities to address the 
question of the continual confinement of persons who present verifi-
able claims of innocence, for most government officials acting in good 
faith are not so callous as to imprison the innocent out of deliberate 
indifference. One of those few opportunities arose in Baker v. McCol-
lan, where the Dallas Police Department refused for three days to ex-
amine its files to determine the validity of the arrestee's claim that he 
was not the person named in a valid arrest warrant.2~0 In fact, the in-
dividual incarcerated was not the person named in the warrant, but 
the Court held that the detention for three days over a New Year's 
weekend did not rise to the level of a due process violation.241 The 
Court did, however, acknowledge: 
[O)epending on what procedures the State affords defendants following 
arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a valid war-
rant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse 
of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of "liberty ... without 
2~~ 
due process of law." 
ers of government."'" (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,527 (1884) (quot-
ing Hank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)))). 
¥!
7 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. 
i!ll! Jd. at 846. 
:r.l9 /d. 
~.w 4.43 u.s. 137, 141 (1979). 
~41 Id. at 145-47. 
2·~ Id. at 145 (omission in original); see also id. at 148 (Biackmun, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that "a sheriff who deliberately and repeatedly refused to check the iden-
tity of a complaining prisoner against readily available mug shots and fingerprints" has 
engaged in an actionable due process violation). 
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Lower courts have regularly held that extended and deliberate refusal 
to examine easily available material that would lead to a prisoner's re-
I . 1 d 245 ease VJO ates ue process. 
In one dimension, the actions of custodians of DNA evidence in 
the cases at 'issue are less culpable than those of pretrial custodians in 
this line of cases, for prosecutors rely not simply on an initial arrest 
warrant, but on a judgment of conviction by which guilt was adjudi-
cated beyond a reasonable doubt. But in another dimension, their ac-
tions are significantly more culpable. Unlike the prison custodian 
who simply declines to check her files, the prosecutor who refuses to 
release DNA for testing makes it impossible for the defendant to 
prove innocence in any alternative fashion. Absent countervailing 
state interests, such an action is at odds with the minimum standards 
of fairness that condition the exercise of the state's police power. As 
Judge Luttig stated: 
[E]xcepting those justices peculiarly inured [to] what can be the ways of 
bureaucracy, that it could indeed be thought shockingly arbitrary that 
the government would literally dispose of the evidence used to deny one 
of his liberty (if not his right to life) before it would turn that evidence 
over to the individual, when he steadfastly maintains his factual inno-
~~' For example, the court in f'airlt:y v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam), considered a situation in which police neither mn a fingerprint com· 
parison nor a DMV check in the face of the defendant's protests of innocence. The 
court held that his twelve-day detention violated due process, since it would have im-
posed only a minimum burden on the city to "institut[el readily available procedures 
for decreasing the risk of erroneous detention," and the failure to do so constituted 
deliberate indifference. ld. at 918; see also Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 
957 (8th Cir, 2001) (stating that state officials' failure to follow :an ob'~>ious lead that 
resulted in erroneous conviction and nine years of false imprisonment may have been 
reckless and, if so, would violate due process); Let: v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 
685 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had a viable due process claim when the Los 
Angeles Police Department failed to compare the fingerprints and physical character-
istics of the plaintiff with tho.<~e from New York and ignored the "obvious mental inca· 
pacity" of the plaintiff, resulting in two years of false imprisonment); Armstrong v. 
SquadriLO, 152 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment for defen· 
darns when, due to the loss of his papetwork, plaiuliff remained in detention for fifty· 
seven days despite his daily oral inquiries and written request forms regarding the 
status of his case); Gray v. Cuyahoga County Sheriffs Dep't, 150 F.3d 579,583 (6th Cir. 
1998) (determining that where the plaintiffs brother had used his name, but the 
physical description and photo of the wanted man looked nothing like the plaintiff, 
deliberate indifference in failing to ascertain identity would make out a constitutional 
violation): Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563-64 (lllh Cir. 1993) (finding 
that where the plaintiff shared a name with the legitimate subject of an arrest warrant, 
but did not share the same identifying traits-hair and eye color. age, birthday, or so-
cial security number-the arresting officer's deliberate indifference to these facts vio-
lated due process). 
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cence and asks only that he be allowed to subject that evidence to tests 
which, it is conceded, given the evidence introduced at trial in support 
of conviction, could prove him absolutely innocent of the crime.2+1 
As we will see, thejustifications given for denial of access in most cases 
amount to nothing more than bureaucratic inertia. 
IV. THE LIMITED BURDENS OF DNA TESTING 
Each of the arguments canvassed above regarding access to courts 
and the due process right to exculpatory' evidence could be rebutted if 
the burdens imposed on the state by DNA production sufficiently 
outweighed the usefulness of access to DNA evidence in avoiding the 
risk of imprisoning the innocent. In arguing against the imposition of 
a postconviction constitutional duty to permit access to DNA evidence, 
courts and prosecutors have asserted the state's interests in finality of 
criminal judgments, avoidance of administrative burdens, and federal-
ism. None of these arguments survives scrutiny. 
A. :Finality 
It cannot be denied that finality is a value in the criminal justice 
system. The Supreme Court has regularly proclaimed that finality is 
essential to both the retributive and deterrent functions of the crimi-
nal law and to the interests of victims of crimes in obtaining closure.245 
144 
Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298,319-20 (4th Cii-. 2002} (Luttig,J., concurring}. 
Assuming that the courts would recognize a right to po.stconviction DNA testing on the 
grounds discus.sed in this Article, it would appear to follow that the prosecutor (or po-
lice} would be under a constitutional duty not to deliberately destroy evidence post· 
trial. Cf Kyle! v. Whitley, 514 U.S. -tl9, 421·22 (1995) (holding that the p.-osc::cutor is 
responsible for any failure to disclose evidence to the defense an.d that, if such a failure 
raises the probability that disclosure would have produced a different outcome, the 
defendant must have a new trial); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) 
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require 
the State to preserve semen samples for testing without a showing of bad faith on the 
part of the police); United St."ltes v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858. 874 (1982) (find-
ing no violation of respondent's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights a.s he failed to dem-
on~trate the materiality of evidence unavailable to him at the time of trial). 
2"~ E.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 ( 1998} (noting that the limits 
imposed on the discretion of federal courts to grant habeas relief • reflect our enduring 
re~pect for 'the State's interest in the finality of convictions'" (quoting Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619,635 (1993))}; Sawye1· v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,338 (1992) (reit-
erating the Court's recognition of the State's interest in finality of convictions); Keeney 
v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 7 ( 1992) (stating that finality ofstate criminal convictions 
is "a matter of particular importance in a federal system"); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 
467, 491 ( 1991} (noting the significance of finality when there is a federul challenge to 
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Reliance upon considerations of finality and the limited power of the 
courts to grant new trials in cases like Smith and Godschalk, however, 
puts the cart of collateral attack before the horse of access to evi-
dence. The threshold issue of whether due process or the right of ac-
cess to the courts require postconviction access to DNA e~dence does 
not entail of its own force any question of judicially ordered release 
from custody or the grant of a new trial.2411 The evidence may incul-
pate, rather than exonerate; if exculpatory, relief may be provided by 
voluntary dismissal of charges or by state clemency proceedings, which 
may be granted notwithstanding the finality of the underlying convic-
tion. 
The issue of postconviction or habeas relief is distinct from the is-
sue of whether a prisoner may seek access to DNA evidence held by 
the prosecutor postconviction simply to test for evidence of inno-
cence. In this context, "finality" has far less weight than in collateral 
challenges to convictions. Testing itself has no impact whatsoever on 
victims, witnesses, or complainants, unless it actually exonerates an 
innocent individual. The request does not implicate any of their in-
terests in repose or privacy since the question of the relevance of the 
evidence to the claim of innocence can be decided without reference 
to testimony or the submission of any further evidence from victims or 
other witnesses. And if the testing demonstrates innocence, neither 
the State's nor the victim's interests in retribution, deterrence, or in-
capacitation are served by continued incarceration. 
If an attack on the underlying conviction eventuates, while the 
State's interest in finality is at its apogee foiJowing exhaustion of avail-
able postconviction and habeas relief, finality has never served as an 
absolute bar to constitutional claims, even when they have been pro-
:~<~7 cedurally defaulted. In the context of federal habeas proceedings, 
while both Congress and the Court have placed great weight on final-
ity in restricting challenges to convictions, the issue of factual inno-
a state criminal conviction); Murray v. Carrier. 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986) (acknowledg· 
ing the value of finality inherent in state coun criminal convictions). 
"'
6 
See Haroey, 285 F.3d at 321-25 (Luuig,J., concurring) (arguing that the majority 
confused a cause of action under§ 1983 with habeas corpus). 
247 
See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,318-20 (1995) (emphasizing that justice often 
requires review of successive and abusive habeas claims). The 1996 amendments to 
the federal habeas statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106, 110 Stat. 1214, 122().21, preclude granting of a 
petition except where ( 1) the Supreme Coun has made a new constitutional rule ret-
roactive, or (2) new facts not discoverable by due diligence would show by clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable jury would find the defendant guilty, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b) (2) (2000). 
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cence is of substantial significance in detenhining access to the writ.248 
In particular, the Court has adopted judge Friendly's view that finality 
should not bar review when a prisoner can make a colorable showing 
f . 2~\1 A-J • p II o mnocence. n:. ustJce owe wrote: 
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second chance to test 
the fundamental justice of his incarceration. Even where, as here, the 
many judges who have reviewed the prisoner's claims in several proceed-
ings provided by the Srnte and on his first petition for federal habeas 
corpus have determined that his trial was free from constitutional error, 
n prisoner retains a fJOluerful rmd legitimttte interest in obtuining his release frorrt 
t:ustody if he is innocent of the charge for which he TllflS incarcerated. That inter-
est does not extend, however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or 
I 
. 250 
pam. 
In Herrera v. Collins, a plurality of the Court ruled that in the ab-
sence of extraordinarily powerful proof of innocence "a claim of 'ac-
tual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim."2r" But whatever 
the merits of this position.2.~~ the Court has assumed that execution of 
the demonstrably innocent would be a constitutional violation. It 
would be anomalous to find no violation when an innocent person is 
24
R See Schl-up, 513 U.S. at 321 (asserting that when a constitutional violation results 
in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court rna)' gram the 
writ without showing cause for the procedural default). 
~•~ Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 8c n.17 (1986) (plurality opinion); see 
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Atttuk on Criminaljudgtnents, 38 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 142, 142 (1970) (arguing that "with a few important exceptions, convic-
tions shoutd be subject to cotlateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his 
constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence"), In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288 ( 1989), the Court ruled that habeas petitions that would result in the establish-
ment of new constitutional protections were barred unless the new rule placed '"cer-
tain kinds of ... conduct beyond the power of the [State]'" or was of the kind that W'dS 
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" lrl. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667,692-93 (1971)). 
2
!>1
1 
Kuhlrnrmn, 477 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added). 
"' 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). A showing of actual innocence provides a "'gatc::way'" 
to federal habeas review of otherwise defaulted claims. Schlup. 513 U.S. at 315 (quot-
ing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404); see Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 849 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(denying fedt:r<~l habeas petition notwithstanding ~mounting evidence that [the peti-
tioner's] conviction W'dS procured by peljured or tlawed eyewitness testimony" because 
the petitioner's claims were without merit). 
25~ See Ht!lrera, 506 U.S. at 426 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that without a 
high threshold of actual innocence, the federal courts would be inundated with frivo-
lous claims); id. aL 437 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require hearing actual innocence claims). 
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sentenced to a substantial period of incarceration.2~~ As the Supreme 
Court of South Dakota observed in a comparable context: 
The results of DNA testing reconcile two competing goals . . . . The first 
goal is to prevent the conviction of an innocent person. The second 
goal is the finality of judgments. Admitting DNA evidence meets both 
goals. If the evidence exonerates the defendant, then the goal of notal-
lowing an innocent person to stand convicted is served. Ir the evidence 
incriminates the defendant, then the goal of finality of judgments is met 
by adding certainty to the result.
254 
Finally, the usual concerns raised by collateral attacks on convictions 
about the reliability of witnesses who come forward years after convic-
tion are lacking in the DNA context.lli"• As contrasted with the poten-
tially elusive, stale, and subjective testimony of witnesses who change 
their testimony or who come forward years after a trial, DNA evidence 
provides morally certain proof and not simply grounds upon which to 
question the validity of the conviction.256 Moreover, this evidence is 
truly "newly discoverable" where DNA testing was unavailable at the 
2~~ See Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 314 (2002) (Luttig,J., concurring) (arguing 
that the Court refused to distinguish between the "constitutionally-protected, post-
conviction interests of the capital and the noncapital prisoner"); see also Herrera, 506 
U.S. at 405 ("It would be a rather strange jurispmdence ... which held that under our 
Constitution he could not be executed, but that he would spend the rest of his life in 
prison."). 
2M Davi v. Class, 2000 SD 30, 1 23, 609 N.W.2d 107, 113; see also Inn: Braxton, 258 
F.3d 250, 259 (4th Cir. 2001) (refusing to issue mandamus against DNA testing order 
because, "' [a}lthough the notion of ¥finality" is important, such finality is not desinble 
when the result is the "finality" of the deprivation of liberty at the expense of a consti-
tutional right'" (quoting Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 784 (E.D. Va. 
2000))). In fact, the court-ordered postconviction DNA testing in Davi decisively in-
culpated the prisoner, a result that obtains in roughly half of postconviction testings. 
See Brooke A. Masters, DNA Testing Confirms Mnn's GuiU in Vn. Rape, WASH. POST, May 
16, 2002, at Bl (w About half of all conclusive postconviction tests inculpate the inmate, 
rather than prove his innocence."). 
2.•~ See Akhil Reed Amar, A Safe Intrusion: We Could "fingerprint" Everyone :S DNA and 
Still Protect Privacy-If Doctrinal Obstructionists Would just G11t Out of the Way, AM. LAw., 
june 2001, at 69, 69 ("If the DNA casts strong doubt on-or indeed conclusively dis-
proves-the convict's guilt, the state's tnte interests are ill served by suppressing 
[DNA] information."); Droelopmmts in the Law-Conftvniing ihe New Challenges of Scien-
tific f..videnCJ~, supra note 133, at 1577-78 (arguing that prosecutors' objections to DNA 
testing have little merit and that all problems would bt: solved if a larger DNA database 
were created). 
256 
See Developments in the Law-Confronting the N~r~o Chtt.Uengts of Scierttific Evidmce, 
supra note 133, at 1578 ("[AJlthough other relevant. evidence may be elusive or stale 
when such [newer forms ot] scientific evidence [are] unearthed, this problem is of less 
concern given the remarkably high degree of certainty provided by exculpatory DNA 
tests."). 
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time of tria1.257 Thus, there can be no question of the diligence of triaJ 
counsel's efforts, "sandbagging" by the defendant, or purposeful de-
lay. In these circumstances, "fundamental fairness" should require· 
postconviction relief. 
B. Administrative Issues 
Prosecutors have argued that aJlowing access to DNA evidence will 
divert scarce resources from other tasks and bury prosecutors beneath 
a tidal wave of frivolous· requests.\!~8 In reality, the administrative bur-
dens of allowing access to DNA evidence are negligible. Prosecutors 
and police would have to retain biological evidence (that has not pre-
viously been discarded), but this places no significant administrative 
burden on the State since the evidence is already in its possession. At 
most, the State would be prohibited from destroying the evidence in 
the future. To the extent prosecutors or police act under regulations 
or standards requiring destruction of evidence, they would be re-
quired to exempt biological evidence from this process. 
The obligations that flow from the arguments canvassed above 
impose no constitutional requirement to test any biological evidence 
absent a specific request on behalf of a convicted individual. Indeed, 
even on request, an obligation would arise only if the DNA existed 
and would, if tested, demonstrate innocence. The number of cases in 
which any prosecutor's office would have to search for and eventually 
provide the defense access to testing is not likely to be very high. 
Prosecutors who have announced the availability of potentially excul-
patory DNA evidence on request have not found themselves subject to 
any overwhelming burdent~1 indeed, even those offices which have 
conducted proactive searches for exculpatory DNA have found only a 
h d e I f h · · · 21;o Th · d" · ...l" .an 1U o cases w. ere testmg IS appropnate, . ere 1s a Istmct •Jis-
incentive to the filing of false claims: prisoners who know that the 
DNA will confirm their guilt risk prejudicing other legal claims they 
may have regarding the fairness of their trial or their access to proba-
tion or clemency. Moreover, by seeking DNA testing, guilty prisoners 
::n See id. ("[T)hese kinds of test results were literally undiscoverable at the time of 
trial and thus, the diligence of the defendant's investigation cannot be questi9ned."). 
2~8 See supra notes 49, 52 (discussing state budget limitations and the possibility of 
abuse as reasons for preventing access to DNA evidence). 
2~9 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (describing practices in Orange 
County, California). 
:K".o See supra notes 32, 36, 39 (describing experiences in San Diego, Brooklyn, and 
Austin). 
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affirmatively place their own DNA profiles in the hands of law en-
forcement officials who may use that information to connect them to 
other crimes. And, as time goes by the universe of cases where blood 
or semen samples were not initially tested will diminish.:ro1 
In cases where the defendant has offered to pay the costs, there 
will be no financial burden on the State unless the defense's testing 
provides exonerating evidence.262 At that point, there will be compel-
ling proof of innocence and the prosecutor will not be able to com-
plain legitimately that testing the evidence in the State's laboratory 
would be an unacceptable burden. In cases in which the defendant is 
indigent, equal protection and due process principles may well re-
quire state-funded testing, but once again the burden will be quite 
modest.:lli! And, as technology advances, the costs and administrative 
burdens will continue to ease. In light of the extraordinary power of 
DNA, a fair balance of interests cannot defeat the right to access. 
C. Federalism and Democracy 
1. Substance 
In Haroey v. Horan, Chiefjudge Wilkinson advanced the claim that 
Congress or state legislatures, and not the federal courts, should 
:ro• A, DNA technology becomes even more sophisticated, otherwise untestable 
samples, including hair :;am pies, may be subject to analysis, thus for a period of time 
increasing the potential pool of cases. S« NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA 
EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: 
PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP ::!8 (2000) (not-
ing that better technology will improve testing of DNA samples that are badly damaged 
or are currently too small to be analyzed), http:/ /www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nti/pubs-sum/ 
183697.htm. 
202 One prominent laboratory, Orchid Cellmark, has quoted the following prices 
for DNA testing: for 13 STR CODIS Core Loci involving Known Samples, $1095 per 
sample; for ¥-Chromosome STR Testing, $1275 per sample. Orchid Cellmark Fee 
Schedule, available at http://www.cellmark-labs.com/pdf/fee~schedule2002.pdf (july 
1, 2002). 
ttl' lf the arguments in favor of access are otherwise sufficient to compel a finding 
that the due process right is fundamental, the modest costs of testing cannot be 
grounds for denial. See supra note 262 {discussing the cost of DNA testing at one labo-
ratory). Due process and equal protection principles provide firm grounds for man· 
dated state testing. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1985) (holding that 
th·e State's refusal to provide the defendant with a psychiatrist constituted a denial of 
due process); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (concluding that the State had to 
provide "blood grouping" tests to a putative father in paternity actions in accordance 
with the due process protection in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
612 UNTVI<:RSTI'Y OF PBNNSYtVANJA LAW REVfBW [Vol. 151: 547 
promulgate standards relating to access to DNA evidence.lffiil Specifi-
cally, he asserted that the federal courts are ill-suited to address the 
questions of which prisoners are entitled to testing; whether a thresh-
old showing would be required (such as contesting identity at trial); 
what degree of proof of innocence the DNA evidence would provide; 
whether a statute of limitations should be interposed; and who should 
pay for the testing, obligations to maintain DNA evidence, and ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent prisoners.~!!\ He echoed the posi-
tion of the National District Attorneys Association that decisions 
should be made "at the state or local level, where decisions can reflect 
the needs, resources and concerns of states and communities."24;r, 
These issues are suitable for legislative resolution, and many states 
and prosecutors have provided access to DNA. But the freedom of 
states to structure their criminal processes is not unbounded, and the 
objections to judicial intervention on "deference" grounds are unper-
suasive where defendants merely seek access to potentially determina-
tive exculpatory evidence that rests in the exclusive possession of the 
State. States may not authorize the use of deadly force on fleeing 
shoplifters/117 detain arrestees indefinitely without arraignment,2c.a or 
physically prevent prisoners from challenging their custody in court 
after conviction,2(~' no matter how much the "concerns of states and 
communities" may dictate such policies. So, too, arbitrary denial of 
access to DNA evidence that could demonstrate innocence falls out-
side of the sphere of lpcal autonomy. As we discussed in the previous 
Section, resolution of these issues on a constitutional level is not diffi-
cult, as the administrative concerns are d!stinctly limited. 
Ultimately, the various concerns raised by Chief Judge Wilkinson 
and others fail to account for the powerful exonerating quality of 
DNA testing. Chiefjudge Wilkinson asserts: 
It is certainly true and a cause for celebration that DNA testing holds 
much promise. And there is no question that accused individuals and 
convicted inmates, as well as prosecutors, should reap the benefits of it. 
Indeed, many scientific advances promise substantial advantages. But 
this does not mean that we are free to constitutionalize a right of access 
2&1 285 F.3d 298, 304 {4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring). 
2u.~ M. at 300·01 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring). 
200 
NAT'L DIST. ATrOR.'IIEYS Ass'N, supra note 45, at 9. 
2
'
17 
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20.22 (1985) (prohibiting officers' use of 
deadj' force against nonviolent, fleeing felons). 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,58-59 (1991). 
!ti'J Ex parte Hull, !112 U.S. 546, 549 (1941); see also suflra note 251 (discussing the 
required showing of"actual innocence" for habeas review). 
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to the fruits of scientific discoveries. There are often trade-offs to be 
faced when science advances. Scientific progress frequently presents 
questions of resource allocation, interpretation, application. privacy, and 
ethics. Balances must be struck between societal risks and benefits, be-
tween alternative ways of understanding and em~loying new techniques, 
· and between permissible and impermissible uses. 
10 
· 
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Whatever the merit of these. concerns with respect to new sci-
ences, they are largely irrelevant here. There are no difficult "trade-
off" issues-not as to "privacy," "societal risks," "alternative ways of 
understanding and employing new techniques," or "ethics," and none 
thus far has been· demonstrated as to "resource allocation." To sug-
gest that constitutionalization of postconviction DNA testing poses any 
of these concerns is to misunderstand the power and accuracy of this 
new science. 
2. Procedure 
In a strict sense, the issue of the constitutional right to access to 
DNA evidence postconviction is purely one of substantive doctrine. If 
the right exists, it is enforceable in state or federal court, and, depend-
ing on the forum that is chosen to litigate the claim, the issue of fed-
eralism may not even be germane.271 However, since a primary means 
of presenting the federal constitutional issues is by suit under the fed-
eral civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federalism issues are often impli-
cated. In the context of a federal suit for injunctive relief to compel 
i
70 
Harvey, 285 F.3d at 301 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring). 
t7l It is important to note that the due proce!lll and access to the courts argument.s 
may also be presented to state courts as a matter of state constitutional law. Over the 
past several decades, state courts have developed state constitutional law principles in a 
manner that often provides greater protections to lndividual1 by interpreting state 
constitutional provisions more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court has constmed 
parallel provisions in the Federal Constitution. See jENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: UTIGATING lNDMDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES§ l-
3(b), at 1-10 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that "even when state and federal clauses are iden-
tical, state policy and history may counsel a different interpretation than the fedeml 
counterpart"); 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS§ 
1:1 (West Group 2001) ("As the Supreme Court becomes less interested in construing 
federal law to protect individual rights and more willing ro restrict access to federal 
courts, litigants have turned to state law and state courts as alternative sources of judi-
cial protection." (footnotes omitted)); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Cvnslilution.v artd the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HA.Rv. L. REv. 489, 495-98 (1977) (recognizing state 
constitutional law as offering greater protection of civil liberties than federal constitu-
tional Jaw). For recent cases invoking state constitutional principles to allow postcon-
viction relief in the case of newly discovered evidence, see Grinols v. State, 10 P.3d 600, 
617 (Alaska CL App. 2000); Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Conn. 
1994); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1335-36 (Ill. 1996). 
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production or testing of the DNA material, a series of "federalism" olr 
jections have been interposed. Chief among these are judicial and 
legislative policies requiring submission of certain federal constitu-
tional claims to the state judicial system in the first instance. 
The argumer:tts that derive from principles requiring exhaustion 
of state remedies rest primarily on the interplay of Heck v. Humphrey,21'l 
Preiser v. Rodriguez,~15 and the Court's insistence on providing the state 
courts with the initial and primary responsibility for resolving federal 
constitutional issues relating to state criminal convictions. In Preiser, 
the Court held that when "a state prisoner is challenging the very fact 
or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a 
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier 
release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of 
habeas corpus. "274 The Court was particularly concerned that § 1983 
not be used to circumvent the exhaustion requirement of federal ha-
beas corpus, as § 1983 suits can come immediately to federal court 
without any need to exhaust state remedies.275 Accordingly, a § 1983 
suit could not be brought to mandate release from custody based on 
an underlying constitutional violation in the state criminal proceed-
• ~76 mgs. 
While a few courts have found Preiser to bar a § 1983 suit for dis-
closure or testing of DNA evidence,m we do not believe that Preiser 
mandates dismissal. The claimant is not by such an action presently 
:rn 512 u.s. 477 (1994). 
:m 411 u.s. 475 (1973). 
27
• /d. at 500. 
2
m /d. at 489. 
¥Ill Requiring st.·ue prisoners to invoke federal habeas corpus to challenge the fact 
or duration of confinement pursuant to a state conviction mandates adherence not 
only to exhaustion of state: rc:medies, but to a myriad of othe.r procedur.d require· 
ments, including a statute of limitations, proper presentation of the issue to the state 
courts, and strict limits on successive petitions. Sei! supra note 23 (noting the proce-
duml barriers). Further, under AEDPA, the federal habeas court must give deference 
to the state court's resolution of the federal con:;titutional issue, and relief may be 
gr.mted only when the state court decision is M'contrary to. clearly established Fed· 
era! law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,· or ... 'involve(s] 
an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law.'" Williams v. Tay-
lor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000) (O'Connor,]., concurring) (omissions in original) (quot· 
ing 28 U.S.C. § 22b4(d)(l) (2000)). 
m E.g., Boyle v. Mayer, No. 02-3124, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19654, at *3 (6th Cir. 
Sept. 17, 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam). The Eleventh Circuit has rejected this argument. Sei! Bmdley v. Pryor, 305 
f.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002) (allowing prisoner's § 1983 suit seeking to compel 
production of DNA evidence to proceed because Msuccess in his suit will not demon-
strate the invalidity of his conviction or sentence"). 
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challenging the fact or duration of her confinement. She challenges 
only the decision by state administrators to bar access to potentially 
determinative evidence, and success in the civil rights action achieves 
access to evidence, nothing more. Depending upon the results of test-
ing, state or federal postconviction remedies of release or a new trial 
may be available, but those questions will be part of an entirely sepa-
rate proceeding. And even if judicial relief is barred, the results of the 
tests may aid in appeals for clemency. 
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Court ruled that§ 1983 suits brought by 
persons convicted of criminal offenses were barred if the relief re-
quested would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] con-
viction or sentence. "27" This doctrine was intended to prevent prison-
ers from avoiding the exhaustion requirements of federal habeas 
corpus by requiring them to challenge their convictions by state ap-
peals or collateral review before seeking federal court intervention. 
However, Heck applies only when the ruling in a civil rights action 
would have the effect of "necessarily imply[ing]" that the conviction 
was unconstitutionai.27'J An order for DNA testing has no direct, much 
less necessary, impact on a conviction.~0 The results may be inculpa-
tory (thereby supporting the conviction), exculpatory, or inconclusive. 
But if exculpatory, there is still no judgment by a court undermining 
the conviction. 
To be sure, the evidence could then be used to seek collateral re-
lief, but that is true with respect to any newly discovered evidence that 
is of sufficient weight to provide grounds for a constitutional chal-
m 512 U.S. at487. 
t'T'J ttl. 
2
., Su Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 308 (4t.'l Cir. 2002) {luttig,J., concuning} 
("I do not believe it even arguable that a post-conviction action merely to permit access 
to evidence for the purpose of STR DNA testing 'necessarily implies' invalidity of the 
underlying conviction."); see also Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(King, j .• concurring) ("The issue ... is simply whether the claim made by Harvey 
would 'necessarily imply' that his conviction should be reversed. In this situation. that 
is plainly not the case .... "). To be sure, Chief judge Wilkinson not only argued, but 
won the point by a two-to-one vote in Haroey, 285 F.3d at 298; see also IJ()]ll!, 2002 U.S. 
App. LEX IS 19654, at •3 (r~jecting prisoner's § 1983 claim seeking access to DNA evi-
dence for testing because it "challenged the validity of his criminal convictions and the 
fact or duration of his continued confinement~); Kutr.nn; 303 F.3d at 341 ("[A] pris. 
oner's request for DNA testing of evidence relevant to his prior conviction is 'so inter-
twined' with the merits of the conviction as to require habeas corpus treatment." 
(quoting Ma1tinez v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals; 292 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 
2002)) ). But as the Eleventh Circuit recently observed: "[l]f [the plaintifl] is success-
ful in his lawsuit, his conviction and sentence will not be called into question, since the 
only thing he will have secu_red is access to evidence." Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1292. 
616 UNIVERSn'Y OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 547 
lenge to the conviction. The claim of a constitutional right to DNA 
postconviction testing is entirely separate from and antecedent to a 
challenge to the conviction. Any question concerning whether the 
DNA evidence is sufficiently exonerating to merit a postconviction 
hearing will be presented in the context of the later postconviction 
petition. At that time, a court can decide, based on an analysis of the 
DNA results and the prosecution's theory of guilt, whether a new trial 
or dismissal is warranted. If the DNA evidence does not exonerate, no 
further proceedings will be necessary. Thus, in the typical case, the 
only state interest asserted is that the mere disclosure of already se-
cured evidence upsets an interest in finality. In the words of Judge 
Luttig, the asserted interest in assuring state authority over finality is 
"non-existent"~81 
CONCLUSION 
Not every good idea or morally correct position is enforceable as a 
matter of constitutional law. In this Article. we have set out to deter-
mine whether the moral intuition that a State may not withhold previ-
ously untested DNA evidence that could fully exonerate one convicted 
of a crime can be established as a constitutional claim. Our investiga-
tion has disclosed that settled due process principles regarding access 
to exculpatory evidence and access to the courts provide a firm doc-
trinal foundation for these claims. 
DNA evidence is unique in its potential exonerating force in the 
most serious of criminal cases. The right of access to the courts can-
not be defeated by the decision of prosecutors not to risk their ver-
dicts by disclosing potentially exculpatory evidence. Due process ju-
risprudence, as reflected in four decades of litigation following Brady 
.\I la ,/ 2R2 d C. • d • . • v .• uary nu. man ates ~~ur proce ures to protect agamst conV!ctwn 
2lll Harvey, 285 F.3d at 320 (Luttig,J., concurring). In the context offed~ral ha· 
bea.~ applications, courts have ordt:red postconviction DNA tests in order to establish 
predicates for other constitutional violations. Sa, e.g., Toney v, Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 
700 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting lower court's determination Lhat permiLting postconvic-
tion DNA tests ~·would open the flood gates for DNA testing ... in every rape case 
where the individual is still serving time'" and finding that "[i]n order to prove the 
prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance claim, [petitioner] is entitled to have ac-
cess to this evidence [for DNA testing]" (omis.~ion in original)); Thomas v. Goldsmith, 
979 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that, in light of the obvious exculpa-
tory potential of semen evidence in a sexual assault case, the State had to turn over 
such evidence in order for the petitioner to attempt to overcome his procedurally 
barred habeas claims). 
~"2 373 U.S. 83 (1963); .see sufnn note 82 (outliningjurisprudence after Brady). 
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and incarceration of the innocent. Prosecutors have a special duty to 
ensure against wrongful convictions, and applying the Brady rule283 in 
the postconviction context, when a claim of innocence is made on the 
basis of existing DNA evidence, strongly advances the private interest 
in liberty while imposing no discernible impact on any legitimate gov-
ernmental interest. With over 100 persons exonerated of serious 
criminal convictions, including capital offenses, finality does not de-
mand-and the Constitution does not tolerate-willful refusal to al-
low access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence. 
m &e supra text accompanying notes 113-17 (discussing the B·rady mle). 
